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ABSTRACT 
UNDERSTANDING COMBAT RELATED PYSCHOLOGICAL DIFFICULTIES IN 
VETERANS: THE ROLE OF CONTEXT BASED MORALITY 
SEPTEMBER, 2011 
RAMILA USOOF, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF PERADENIYA 
 
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS, AMHERST 
 
Ph.D. UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS, AMHERST 
 
Directed by: Professor Ronnie Janoff-Bulman 
 
In five multi-method studies this dissertation examined how context based 
morality may explain increased incidence of combat related psychological difficulties 
among US service personnel. We were particularly interested in the relationship between 
causing harm to others and moral self-perceptions and related emotional consequences. In 
studies 1 and 2 we found that our samples of Iraq and Afghan war veterans reported that 
a soldier would feel increased levels of guilt and shame and negative moral judgments of 
the self when they return home and reflect on incidents of harm that may have occurred 
during their deployments. These two studies were supported by three short experiments 
showing that different moral judgments of harm were made depending on whether the 
harm doing was interpersonal or intergroup. Interpersonal harm doing was judged more 
harshly than  intergroup harm leading us to believe that while in combat harm doing had 
minimal consequences on the self-perceptions and emotions of a soldier and that when 
they returned home to civilian life where interpersonal moral standards are more 
prevalent their self-perceptions and emotional wellbeing was affected by their prior 
conduct.       
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Media reports of U.S. military personnel returning home from Iraq and 
Afghanistan expose the dire need for more information to better understand their mental 
health needs. In early 2010 the Department of Veteran Affairs Secretary Eric Shinseki 
announced that 20% of all suicides in the U.S. (approximately 30,000 suicides annually) 
were committed by soldiers returning from war. In a National Public Radio interview  
(AFP, 2011) he suggested that these numbers could be attributed to the stress and “ the 
trauma that goes with the current operations, where we have a much smaller military 
being asked to do so much and then repeat it tour after tour.”  
 While suicide is the most extreme manifestation of the psychological suffering 
endured as a result of combat experiences, psychological disorders such as posttraumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD), depression and anxiety disorders are also considered to be 
widespread and increasing among these veterans, especially those of a younger age. 
However, the numbers that are reported may not provide a complete picture of the 
psychological distress suffered by these soldiers. Commonly, there is a time lapse 
between the traumatic experience and the presentation of symptoms, making it likely that 
these numbers will increase further in the coming years. Though there is little controversy 
about the numbers of suicides among veterans of the recent wars, there is some debate as 
to what the real numbers are for those suffering from psychological difficulties related to 
combat experiences. Thus studies have varied widely in their estimation of prevalence of 
psychological difficulties such as PTSD.   While findings of most studies have fallen 
between 5 % and 10% of their respondents (Hoge, Castro, Messer, McGurk, Cotting & 
Koffman, 2004), these estimates fluctuate dramatically depending on the assessment tool, 
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the unit of the military that is assessed, the unique experiences of the units involved,  and 
when the soldiers were assessed.  However, what is generally agreed upon is that a 
substantial number of young men and women who have  served in Iraq and Afghanistan 
are suffering from psychological difficulties such as PTSD, and this has a direct negative 
impact on their quality of life when they finally  rejoin civil society.  
Researchers, for many years, have been trying to understand why soldiers of these 
wars are experiencing psychological difficulties at a seemingly higher rate than, for 
example, World War II.  Traditionally, the focus of such research has been directed at 
experiences that feel threatening to the well-being of the soldiers and their sense of 
vulnerability. Being injured, being shot at, witnessing the death of a buddy, and being in 
close proximity to danger are regarded as correlates of psychological difficulties such as 
PTSD, other anxiety disorders and depression.  However, with  the Vietnam War, 
researchers also began to understand the importance of the uniqueness of modern 
warfare. They have begun to focus on  a factor that previously had been largely ignored 
but seems to be key to understanding psychological difficulties among war veterans—
that is,  having to engage in actions that cause harm to others, particularly non-
combatants. Such experiences seem strongly  related to the psychological distress  
suffered by combat veterans.  Litz, Stein, Delaney, Lebowitz, Nash, Silva & Maquen 
(2009)  in particular  have broadened this focus and claim that committing any type of 
harm-doing, witnessing harm-doing and not attempting to stop harm-doing are all related 
to psychological distress. Broadly, the current  research attempted to better understand 
this relationship between the perpetration of harm on others and its psychological 
implications via the concept of contextualized morality. For our purposes we do not limit 
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ourselves to killing or atrocities, but like Litz et al. (2009) we define harm-doing more 
broadly to include mistreatment of or injury to civilians. 
1.1 Combat-Related Psychological Distress and Moral Injury 
 Vietnam marked the shift from conflict between states that had armies of 
comparable size to “war amongst the people” (Smith, 2006, p. 5). In these cas of modern 
warfare, the battlefield is not clearly defined; distinguishing between civilian and 
combatant is impossible,  and this leads to uncertainty with regard to appropriate 
behavior towards civilians. For example 17% of respondent in one survey suggested that 
non-combatants should be treated as insurgents (Mental Health Advisory Team [MHAT-
IV] 2006). The vagueness of the battlefield increases the ambiguity of tense situations 
that the soldiers face, as they can never be entirely sure of the motives of any person they 
encounter; at the same time since every civilian is a potential enemy, the likelihood of 
acting in ways that might harm them also increases Often incidents involving harm to 
enemy-civilians are discussed in terms of their impact on the victims or their effect on 
military strategy. Very rarely do scholars refer to the impact such behavior has on the 
person perpetrating the harm. As Litz et al., (2009) point out, their consequences on the 
psychological well-being of the soldiers also need to be seriously considered.  
While most of these studies discussed a relationship between perpetration of harm 
and PTSD, more recently researchers have suggested that the psychological difficulties 
associated with such experiences, though similar to PTSD in their manifestation, are in 
fact a distinct constellation of symptoms, that Litz et al. (2009) label “moral injury.” 
These researchers define moral injury as resulting from “perpetrating, failing to prevent, 
bearing witness or learning about acts that transgress deeply held moral beliefs and 
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exceptions.”  In a review, they propose that the resulting shame and to a lesser degree 
guilt affects not only self-perceptions but also the manner in which they interact with the 
world. They further propose that it is the attributions attached to how the self is seen in 
relation to the event that creates these feelings of shame and guilt. If the attributions 
about the transgressions are seen as enduring--as a disposition or a character flaw-- then 
this experience is likely to lead to these negative emotions. Litz et al. (2009) discuss this 
relationship in terms of cognitive dissonance.  We were interested in providing a more 
thorough understanding of this phenomenon, from the war zone to the return to civilian 
life, and proposed that context based morality could help  explain the relationship 
between perpetration of harm and negative affect and self-perceptions. 
 Moral injury is a relatively new idea; virtually all the relevant research to date 
has explored the relationship between the perpetration of harm and PTSD, not the broader 
construct of moral injury. In the current  research,  rather than focus on a particular 
psychological disorder, we examined how such experiences impact negative emotion and 
self-perceptions in response to such events. In previous research these have been shown 
to be correlates of psychological difficulties and disorders. Our decision to do this was a 
response to ethical concerns related to asking veterans about psychological difficulties 
they suffer when we were unable to provide them with relevant services and also the 
realization that asking our respondents about their diagnoses might make them 
uncomfortable, leading to non-participation and attrition of participants. 
1.2 Veterans’ Harm-Doing and PTSD: Past Research  
The National Vietnam Veterans Readjustment Study (NVVRS, 1990) reports a 
30.9% lifetime and 15% current prevalence of PTSD among Vietnam veterans (MacNair, 
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2002). A diagnosis of PTSD requires the presence of antecedent traumatic events, defined 
at the time of the NVVRS as events that are markedly distressing and outside the range of 
usual human experience—especially events that threaten the life or physical integrity of 
the individual or someone close to him or her; the definition also includes witnessing 
death or serious injury to others (APA, 2000). PTSD symptoms include re-experiencing 
trauma via intrusive thoughts, dreams or memories; numbing of responsiveness 
demonstrated by constricted affect, feelings of detachment of others, or diminished 
interest in important activities; and the presence of at least two other symptoms such as 
sleep disturbance, exaggerated startled response, guilt, memory impairment, trouble 
concentrating, and phobias about activities triggering recollection of the event (DSM IV- 
TR). 
The NVVR studies have found that those who said they engaged in killing were 
more prone to experience these symptoms, more than those who had not killed. Also, 
such diagnosis of PTSD was higher for those who had directly engaged in atrocities than 
for those who had only witnessed the events (Strayer & Ellenhorn, 1975; Breslau & 
Davis, 1987; Green, 1990; Hendin & Hass, 1984; Grossman, 1995). Beckham, Feldman 
& Kirby (1998), in a study of Vietnam veterans, measured guilt, stress and involvement 
in atrocities among them. In this study almost all the Vietnam veteran participants 
reported having taken part in atrocities (93%); 82%  reported direct involvement in the 
violence, 33% reported endorsing participation in mutilation, and 54% observed 
mutilation.  Veterans related engaging in an average of 29 acts of atrocities. The 
researchers found that both combat exposure and atrocity exposure were related to PTSD 
severity. Interestingly, however, when controlling for combat exposure, atrocity exposure 
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still predicted PTSD,  global guilt, cognitions of guilt, hindsight bias and responsibility of 
wrongdoing (Beckham et al., 1998).  
Southwick, Gilmartin, Mcdonough, Morrissey (2006) also compared how 
engaging in atrocities in combat situations differed from killing in traditional combat, in 
terms of outcomes for PTSD. They found that PTSD was more severe for perpetrators 
than for non-perpetrators and that killing increased the likelihood of someone suffering 
from PTSD. Engaging in atrocities increased PTSD risk. In many ways the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq are very similar to Vietnam War, in that they have been fought 
among the civilian population, with no clear combat opponents, and they have been 
relatively unpopular here at home. Therefore, it is not surprising that veterans of the Iraq 
and Afghan wars would also manifest similar patterns in both their war and psychological 
experiences.  
While most of the previous research has focused on establishing the relationship 
between perpetration of harm and the experience of psychological difficulties, we were 
interested in investigating the psychological processes behind this phenomenon. We 
argue that engaging in harm-doing directly affects the moral judgments that a person 
makes of himself or herself and the emotional reaction such a person has towards his/her 
behavior. While negative self- perceptions are in themselves damning, we also believe 
that others may also see the person as immoral, which adds an additional layer of 
difficulty to the experience. 
1.3 Morality, Social Inclusion, and Self-Esteem 
A review of the literature on morality and moral judgments points to the fact that 
morality is one of the key bases, if not the most important basis, by which an individual is 
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judged by others. Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics recognized the centrality of morality 
in judging others, for he emphasized the importance of righteous indignation, being just, 
sincerity, wisdom and friendliness (as cited by Robinson, 1986).  In fact he postulated 
that competence and friendliness are only important if they are expressed through moral 
avenues.  In more contemporary work, Schwartz (1992) found that morality was 
universally named as the most important factor in judging a person as a worthy group 
member. Although some researchers have argued that self-perceptions of morality are 
used to bolster self-esteem when someone has lost face in other realms (Blanz, 
Mummendey & Otten, 1995 & Ellemers & van Rijswijk, 1997), considerable research 
has found that people rate being moral as more important than other characteristics such 
as competence and intellectual ability. For example Schwartz & Bardi (2001) found that 
American students said that it was more important to be honest than to be competent.  
Many of these studies focused on judgments made at the individual level, either 
about oneself or about another, but similar findings have been reported at the group level 
as well. Recent work on group perceptions that looked at competence, sociability and 
morality (using orthogonal measures) found that morality was the most important factor 
in judging the group as worthy (Leach, Ellemers & Barreto, 2007). Even when 
participants did not ascribe the most morality to their ingroup, they nevertheless viewed 
morality as the primary factor when evaluating their ingroup.   
Given that morality is the basis for social inclusion and exclusion, engaging in a 
moral transgression could have severe negative consequences for an individual. Although 
going against any single moral rule would constitute a moral transgression, it seems that 
not all moral transgressions are equal. Interestingly, transgressions involving moral 
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proscriptions, including particularly harm-doing, seem to have a stronger impact on how 
the individual is treated within the group (Janoff-Bulman, Shiekh & Hepp, 2010). Yet 
even in the absence of obvious harm, transgressions often result in immediate 
condemnation of the behavior and the person. Findings from Haidt’s (2001) 
“dumbfounding experiments,” for example, show that perceived moral transgressions 
(even without harm) elicit spontaneous condemnatory responses driven by negative 
emotions.  Also, Pizarro, Laney, Morris & Loftus (2006) found that if study participants 
received negative information about an individual’s morality, when tested a week later 
they remembered the target person as having committed a more serious transgression 
than the person had really committed (Study 1); this suggests that negative responses to 
moral transgressions may have a long-term negative effect on how an individual is 
perceived. 
Other research has found that perceived moral transgressions not only result in 
condemnation, but also in isolation of the offender. This is evident in studies that have 
explored the “moral mandate effect.” The moral mandate, or the strong connection 
between an attitude and a moral belief (Mullen & Skitka, 2006), is an important factor in 
how individuals create interpersonal relationships. Anyone who holds an opposing moral 
mandate is seen as going against moral rules that govern the group. Therefore, when 
people learn that another individual has beliefs that violate their moral mandates, they 
show strong intolerance of the other. They also establish greater social distance from the 
other. 
Being isolated and alienated is a difficult prospect with real negative 
psychological consequences, for it thwarts one of the most basic needs of the being 
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human; the need to belong (Adler, 1930; Maslow, 1943 & 1954; Bowlby, 1969 & 1970; 
Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Fiske, 2004).  Adler (1930) identified the two basic needs 
that drive human behavior: the need for superiority and the need to belong, or “social 
feeling.” He describes social feeling as people’s tendency to “unite themselves with other 
human beings, to accomplish their tasks in cooperation with others.” (p. 115).  Although 
initially Adler viewed these two motivations as distinct and equal, in later writing he 
identified the motivation to belong as the more fundamental. He argued that “...feeling 
worth…stems from a close bond with community of man” (pg. x–ix).  In later years, 
Adler (1937) also expanded the concept of social feeling to encompass the human 
striving to contribute to the group and to be seen as a valuable member of the group, and 
he located the motivation for superiority in this desire to contribute to the group (also see 
Ferguson, 1989, for a discussion). 
More recently Fiske (2004) argued in the same manner that the need for 
belongingness is one of the primary human motivations and would produce negative 
consequences if not fulfilled. Baumeister and Leary (1995) also propose that the need for 
belongingness is of the utmost importance to the individual; rejection may make a person 
feel bad and depressed and may negatively affect psychological well-being over the long 
term (Baumeister, 1991). It is not surprising that the social exclusion as a consequence of 
moral transgressions can lead to negative outcomes.  As Cooley (1972) noted in 
describing the “looking glass self,”, each person “live(s) in the minds of others without 
knowing it.” Humans continually monitor themselves from the point of view of others 
and how one perceives oneself, through the eyes of others, could result in extremely 
intense emotion, including pride and shame (Scheff, 2005). Thus being excluded and 
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shunned from the group because of a moral transgression can lead to the disruption of 
normal functioning.   
This is supported by studies that have found that even the threat of social rejection 
leads to lowered self-esteem (Gailliot & Baumeister, 2007). Other effects of social 
rejection include high levels of anxiety, high levels of risk-taking in children, lower 
levels of empathy, emotional insensitivity, lowered self-regulation and intelligent 
thought, and increased aggressive and self-defeating behavior (Baumeister, Brewer, Tice 
& Twenge, 2007;  DeWall & Baumiester, 2006; Nesdale & Lambert, 2008; Twenge & 
Baumeister, 2005; Twenge, Baumeister, DeWall, Ciarocco, & Bartels, 2007).  
Individuals are highly motivated to be accepted by--to belong to-- their group and to 
avoid being rejected and excluded.   
1.4 War, PTSD, and Social Exclusion 
 These negative person perceptions and social exclusion were evident in the case 
of the Vietnam War, where society at large judged returning Vietnam veterans rather 
harshly. The sense that no one else is able to understand the conditions under which the 
atrocities took place and the fear of being judged and being blamed frequently prevents 
veterans from engaging in conversations about their experiences.  This encourages 
veterans to isolate themselves, which is a primary characteristic for those who suffer from 
PTSD and is also often associated in these patients with higher risk for self-harm such as 
suicide. 
Further public disapproval alsot eliminates one of the essential conditions for 
overcoming PTSD. A large body of literature has found that social support is associated 
with better outcomes for PTSD sufferers. Both support before and after a traumatic event 
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can considerably decrease the likelihood of the occurrence of PTSD. Human social 
experience is central to the manner in which people respond to traumas. Social 
experience can come in the form of a relationship with a parent, a friend, a partner, a 
community or a group. It is this social experience that buffers against mental distress 
resulting from chronic disease. In two meta-analytic studies, this was found to be the case 
for PTSD as well (Brewin, Andrews & Valentine 2000; Ozer, Best, Lipsey & Weiss, 
2000).  
A 14-year follow–up study of PTSD among Vietnam veterans found that social 
support was a protective factor and the lack of social support was an aggravating factor 
(Koenen, Stellman, Stellman & Sommers, 2003; Summerfield & Hume, 1993). This 
study found that veterans with more community involvement were more likely to have 
their PTSD go into remission. On the other hand, those who felt negative community 
attitudes upon returning home were likely to continue to have chronic PTSD. These two 
variables point to a connection to the quality of community networks.  Reintegration into 
the community means creating social bonds, but it can also mean negative attitudes that 
signal isolation, ostracism and lack of social connection. Similar findings have been 
reported with rape victims. Isolation and a perception of being blamed increases the 
likelihood of prolonged PTSD among rape victims (Filipas & Ullman, 2001; Ullman 
1996; Ullman & Filipas, 2001).  Zoellner, Foa and  Brigidi (1999) report that when 
controlling for initial severity of symptoms, social friction increased the likelihood of the 
maintenance of PTSD.  
Some traumatic events are more likely to elicit negative responses. Those that are 
actually seen and experienced by a majority of the community elicit relatively positive 
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community responses, whereas events that are unseen, unshared, and ambiguous will 
result in more negative attitudes (Andrews & Brewin, 1990). The latter fits the situation 
of Vietnam and Iraq, where the average American may not understand the circumstances 
of combat.  
While negative judgments and social exclusion may be difficult for these soldiers 
to contend with, the more potent and innocuous threat maybe that these responses by 
others also color the self-perceptions soldiers have of themselves. Not only does the lack 
of social support create isolation and emotional disengagement, but it can also create 
additional self-blame. The looking glass self is a powerful factor in how individuals judge 
themselves (Cooley, 1902). The knowledge that society at large may judge you to be an 
immoral person can only increase feelings of self-blame and moral failure. This may be 
harder to contend with as it becomes an ever-present condemnation of the self that the 
person is unable to ignore.  
Generally seeing the self as immoral also has emotional ramifications for the 
person. As Beckham et al., (1998) found, one of the key reactions to the recognition that 
one has engaged in combat-related atrocities is the feeling of global guilt. Feeling guilty 
is often followed by a need to engage in reparative behavior (Tangney, Wagner, Hill-
Barlow, Marschall & Gramzow, 1996), but in these cases soldiers are often unable to go 
back to make amends.  This sort of chronic unresolved guilt has been identified as 
maladaptive (see, e.g., Tangney, 1991), often leading to self- punishing behavior ( Exline, 
Deshea & Holeman, 2007) and chronic ruminations (Silfver, 2007). Ruminations are a 
common symptom of those suffering from PTSD and moral injury. Therefore, we could 
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make the claim that unresolved guilt among soldiers is associated with their 
psychological difficulties. 
In addition, they are also likely to have intense feelings of shame. While guilt is 
associated with a single event, shame is generally related to a more global negative 
perception of the self (Lewis, 1993; Tangney, 1991). While a soldier may feel guilt about 
a particular incident it is also possible that perpetrating harm may also have an effect on 
the global perceptions of the self. The threatened self-view destroys one of the key 
assumptions that govern our world view.  We each hold fundamental assumptions that the 
world is meaningful and benevolent, and we are good, moral people, and trauma involves 
the shattering of one or more of these assumptions (Janoff-Bulman, 1992). Research 
looking at the relationship between self-perception and psychological difficulties has 
focused on ideas about not being able to protect oneself and not being able to depend on 
the self to act in a manner that allows the person to be safe. However, recognizing that 
one has behaved in a manner that is inhumane, cruel and immoral will make the 
individual question the fundamental assumption about the self as good and moral. When 
fundamental assumptions are shattered they take with them the sense of stability and 
security they had provided, to be replaced by intense anxiety and extreme psychological 
distress (Janoff-Bulman, 1992). Additionally, the fact that one cannot perceive the self as 
moral anymore can produce  self-encompassing shame. Therefore, in our research we 
hoped to find these negative emotions, guilt and  shame,  associated with believing that a 
person had behaved in a manner that was deemed to be immoral; we expected that such 
behavior would also result in negative self-perceptions and self-evaluations. 
1.5 Context Based Morality: Interpersonal vs. Intergroup Standards   
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The socialization of a young child universally includes lessons about moral rules 
that he or she needs to follow to be a valued member of society. Though manifest in 
different ways, the rules include two basic principles: the proscription, do not harm others 
and the prescription, help others (Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh & Hepp, 2009). More 
specifically, the rules discourage lying, cheating, causing physical injury to other 
members of your social group while at the same time encouraging giving to charity, 
volunteering and in general helping fellow society members when they need help. 
Learning these rules is important because not following these rules can result in social 
exclusion– an action that is considered necessary to maintain social cohesion. These are 
standards that govern our day to day dealings; the default moral rules that keep us on the 
straight and narrow. For our research we label them interpersonal morals. 
However, there are some special circumstances in which these default 
interpersonal moral standards are overridden by a new set of moral standards. Typically, 
they are situations in which groups and group membership are salient. There is clear 
evidence that group interactions do not seem to adhere to the interpersonal moral 
standards. As Tajfel and Turner (1986) point out, the individual behaves differently when 
group identity is salient than when personal identity is salient. Research in this realm has 
shown that in groups, individuals are much more competitive than in individual 
interactions, and that group members are generally lenient against group members who 
aggress towards members of other groups (Mummendey & Otten, 1998). While support 
from the collective for intergroup violence is important, there is also clear evidence that 
groups in general are more hostile and competitive than individuals. Therefore 
individuals in an intergroup situation are more likely to be  violent. These conclusions are 
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based on studies based on interindividual–intergroup discontinuity research (Hoyle, 
Pinkley & Insko, 1989; Schopler, Insko, Drigotas & Graetz, 1993; Schopler, Insko, 
Wieselquist, Pemberton, Witcher & Kozar, 2001).  In addition it is also clear that the 
interaction becomes more competitive due to the fear, distrust and greed a group of 
individuals feel when they are confronted with another group that is in competition with 
them (Schopler et al., 1993). 
This is further supported by Mummendey & Otten (1998), who presented 
participants with videos that included aggressive actions that were either portrayed in an 
inter-individual or intergroup context. In the intergroup conditions the participants were 
either of the same group as the perpetrator or from a different group. Keeping with the 
predictions overall, same group perpetrators’ behaviors were evaluated less negatively. 
More interestingly, however, they found that participants perceived the same group 
perpetrators’ behavior against an outgroup the least negative, and behavior against a 
member of the ingroup as most negative. In a different study subjects perceived the 
perpetrator as behaving in a manner that was in keeping with the group norm when 
aggressing against a member of an outgroup, while an individual who engaged in 
aggression towards an ingroup member was perceived to be harmful to the group. 
The norms of the group can be transmitted from the group to the individual in the 
form of social roles that the individual assumes. Zimbardo’s (l973) Stanford prison 
experiment was the classic reproduction of the justification of behavior as role-based. In a 
retrospective analysis of the study, Zimbardo (2007) explains the effect being randomly 
assigned to either a prisoner or a guard had on the average college student--often turning 
the student into a physically and emotionally broken prisoner or a brutal, sadistic guard. 
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Zimbardo himself admits to having been carried away by the role of the prison warden, 
ignoring the cruel treatment of the prisoners by the guards.   
Zimbardo explains the transformation of the guards in terms of the roles that they 
were playing (Zimbardo, Maslach & Haney, 1999). Among the lessons Zimbardo 
professes to have learned from this particular study is that part of the power of the 
situation lies in social roles that provide  permission to behave in ways that would 
otherwise be impossible. Thus in the case of the prison guards the cruel behavior could be 
justified in terms of permitted behavior for that particular role. He further points out that 
under conditions where there is no real threat or external compunction to behave in this 
cruel manner, cognitive dissonance (see Festinger, 1957) enabled individuals to ignore 
personality traits and general inhibitions against cruelty; the less the compunction and 
external justification, the more dissonance, resulting in more uncharacteristic behavior 
(Zimbardo et al., 1999). Importantly, playing a particular role in this case also meant that 
the participants were thinking of the other prison guards within the closed confines of the 
simulated prison as their primary group. As recalled by Zimbardo (2007), the beginning 
of the most cruel treatment of the prisoners began when the prisoners decided to rebel 
against the guards. The prisoners were seen as a threat to the group and therefore had to 
be dealt with appropriately. Therefore part of the role that the prison guards were playing 
became the protection of the group and prison “society.” The relaxation of the constraints 
against cruel behavior provided by the role, coupled with the belief that one was 
behaving for the good of the group, provided the perfect mix for the character 
transformation that was witnessed. 
 17 
 
The Abu Ghraib scandal provided a real life replication of what went on in the 
Stanford prison (Zimbardo, 2007). Reports emerged of the inhumane torture of prisoners 
at the prison and were supported by photographs. The official interpretation and 
explanation for the incident was that it was the work of a few bad apples. However, as 
Zimbardo points out, a pervasive understanding that this behavior was acceptable in this 
particular situation, where the prisoners were “enemies” and there was a lack of 
guidelines as to how these prison guards should act, made the torture virtually inevitable. 
The prison guards could act in inhumane, cruel ways while justifying the behavior as part 
of the role of a guard in an Iraqi prison, with minimal damage to their self-perception.  
As exemplified in part by the prison experiment, the relationship between salience 
of the group and hostile, violent behavior seems to be made stronger by external threats 
to the group. Lahti & Weinstein (2005) point out that commitment to the group is 
inversely related to group stability: when the group is threatened, members of the group 
are more committed to the group.  Similarly, in a cross-cultural study based on archival 
data for several different preindustrial societies, Cohen, Montoya and Insko (2006) found 
that loyalty to the group increased favorable attitudes towards outgroup violence and also 
increased the likelihood of war.  Cohen et al. (2006) argue that this is because the moral 
standards that govern human behavior change when the focus shifts from the individual 
level to the intergroup level.  
Individual level interpersonal morality emphasizes altruism, concern for others 
and avoidance of harm against others, the essential moral rules discussed earlier. In a 
sense, moral codes postulate that this is the manner in which every other human being 
should be treated. In other words, the ingroup in this case could be considered all of 
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humankind, with no outgroup to compare against. In instances when ingroup—outgroup 
differences become salient, intergroup rather than interpersonal morality becomes 
dominant.  Thus, threat to the ingroup not only makes the group more cohesive, but also 
changes the moral norms that the group members are expected to follow. Cohen et al. 
(2006) argue that the intergroup morality that functions in such a situation is 
characterized by competition and any other action that favors the group, no matter how 
unfavorable the consequences of these actions to the outgroup. There is no single 
superordinate group or collection of individuals, as in the case of interpersonal morality.  
Rather, there is an ingroup and an outgroup that can be identified as outside the boundary 
of one’s own group.    
Pinter, Insko, Wildschut, Kirchner, Montoya & Wolf (2007) assigned participants 
either to an individual interaction or a group interaction. For the individual interaction 
condition, two participants were seated individually in two separate rooms, while for the 
group interactions two groups of three participants were seated in the two rooms. In the 
group condition, one participant in each group was assigned the role of the leader and this 
person was in charge of the interaction. The other members of the group would, however, 
consult with the leader about the interaction. In both conditions participants then engaged 
in the Prisoners’ Dilemma Game.  In each of the trials, each individual or group leader 
was either able to cooperate or compete with the other. If both parties in the interaction 
cooperated, they would benefit equally; if one party were to compete and the other were 
to cooperate, the party competing would benefit more, and finally if both parties 
competed, both parties would again benefit equally, but less than if they  both  
cooperated.  Pinter et al. (2007) found that in the group condition leaders were 
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significantly more likely to be competitive than those assigned to the individual 
interaction. These findings have been replicated in several other studies, mostly using 
variations of the Prisoners’ Dilemma Game.   
Though this phenomenon is often described as being suggestive of group 
morality, the researchers do not explain exactly why these differences in behavior occur. 
We propose that when participants interact in groups,  the default interpersonal moral 
standards are overridden by group moral rules.. We explain this difference in behavior as 
a shift from interpersonal moral standards to group moral standards-- a shift from 
avoiding harm and helping that facilitate group living to a focus on protecting the group. 
Graham, Haidt & Motyl (2010), have shown some evidence of the focus of moral 
concern shifting to group loyalty, authority and sanctity when religious group becomes 
salient, suggesting the possible operation of group moral standards. While these findings 
are encouraging there is still no clear evidence of our prediction that behaviors seen as 
proscriptive in interpersonal contexts become more similar to prescriptions or allowances 
in intergroup contexts.     
 Intergroup moral standards would mostly occur in a situation where two groups 
are in a zero–sum competition making threat to the group salient; this is qualified by 
certain other conditions. We propose that these group moral standards do not apply to all 
groups equally; rather these group moral standards apply most strongly to one’s own 
ingroup. However, group moral standards will be the basis for judgments about harmful 
behaviors when the competition is between any two groups. This provided us with the 
research framework to understand the psychological difficulties of veterans returning 
home. Combat situations, being intense, zero-sum intergroup interactions, elicit 
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intergroup moral standards of complete loyalty to the group even if it means causing 
harm to another. This harm-doing may not be seen as highly immoral; it may be seen as 
not so immoral, but rather justified and understandable. These moral standards act as a 
protective factor that prevents soldiers while deployed from experiencing the negative 
self-perceptions and negative emotions that are related to the harm-doing. However, on 
their return to civilian life, removed from the intergroup context they revert to (default) 
interpersonal moral standards. They also become starkly aware that they are being judged 
by others based on these interpersonal standards and revert also to judging themselves 
using these standards. The harm-doing that could be justified previously can no longer be 
seen as justified. This results in the person seeing him or herself as immoral and also in 
feelings of guilt and shame that lead to psychological difficulties.   
1.6 Current Studies 
The first set of studies in this dissertation examined the relationship between  
harm-doing by soldiers  and immoral self-perceptions and negative emotions about the 
self.  In Study 1, we used a focus group and several interviews to investigate soldiers’ 
experiences involving incidents of perpetration of harm. In addition the study also served 
as an opportunity to validate our theoretical perspective with our participants. Study 2, a 
survey with a larger sample of veterans, enabled us to further generalize and quantify our 
findings from Study 1. We were interested in general information about the deployment, 
soldier experiences with civilians during their deployment, incidents of harm, how these 
events of harm were construed during the deployments, if and how the construal changed 
when they returned to the U,S,, and most importantly how they responded in terms of 
affect and self-perceptions. We hypothesized that interpersonal interactions and 
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intergroup interactions would elicit different moral standards, and  moral judgments of 
perpetrations of harm would differ depending on which of these standard are being used. 
More specifically, a shift in moral standards (from interpersonal to intergroup morality) 
with changes in the context (deployment to civilian life), were expected to lead to 
increased negative affect and  self-perceptions and to harsher moral judgments. 
 In the second set of studies  we focused more generally on the differential use of 
interpersonal or intergroup moral standards in judging harm-doing. Studies 3, 4 & 5 were 
experiments where our overarching hypothesis was that in contexts where intergroup 
moral standards are salient perpetration of harm would lead to less negative affect and  
less harsh moral judgments than the same transgression in a context where interpersonal 
moral standards are salient. Studies 3 and 4 used combat-related event descriptions to 
manipulate salience of intergroup and interpersonal moral standards. Intergroup conflict 
and war are perhaps the clearest examples of situations where intergroup moral standards 
arise.  
However, we also wanted to explore whether  these hypotheses would apply to more 
mundane examples of group behavior. Therefore, in Study 5 we focused on a case of 
academic cheating and attempted to manipulate the moral standard used to judge the 
behavior . 
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CHAPTER 2 
STUDY 1 
As discussed earlier, the first two studies were an attempt to explore veterans’ 
experiences with perpetration of harm and their responses to such instances. Having 
returned home after serving in the different theatres of war, these soldiers were in the 
unique position of having experienced a dramatic shift from intergroup moral standards 
in the combat theatre to interpersonal moral standards once they returned home. It 
therefore seemed that the consequences of this shift in moral standards would be apparent 
and could be readily explored with this group. 
Study 1 went through two iterations. The first attempt at conducting the study was 
in the form of a focus group. The main purpose of the group was to receive feedback on 
our model about the shift between intergroup and interpersonal moral standards and how 
it might affect psychological well-being. We set out to conduct a focus group of 8-10 
people. The recruitment email stating that the study would be a discussion of their 
combat experiences was sent through the Veterans’ Services office at UMass, Amherst. 
However, due to a poor response rate we decided to conduct the focus group with the five 
participants who responded to our email. These participants had all agreed to meet at the 
appointed time for the focus group, yet in the end only two of them showed up. We 
proceeded anyway.   
The discussion began with the researchers explaining the purpose of our meeting-
-to get feedback on our theoretical explanation of the psychological distress suffered by 
veterans of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars (see Appendix 1 for the complete transcript of 
opening discussion).  While we had said that we would audiotape the focus group, to 
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make the interaction as non- threatening as possible we decided that we would not to do 
so. We explained that our theory proposed that veterans of war were shifting between 
moral standards, specifically intergroup moral standards in the battlefront and 
interpersonal moral standards when they return home to the U.S.; and we believed that 
the shift in moral standards may have real consequences for the psychological well-being 
of the veterans via their self-perception of morality. We understood that in the context of 
combat causing harm was often acceptable and even required. A good soldier was 
defined as someone who fought for his country and made sure that his “buddies” were all 
safe. These were the tenets of intergroup moral standards; the group’s well-being was of 
the greatest priority. From this perspective, any action that caused harm, especially to 
someone who was identified as being a threat to one’s group, would likely not have a 
negative impact on the way that the soldier would perceive the morality of him or herself.  
However, upon returning home, the context change may elicit interpersonal moral 
standards. The change would likely have significant negative consequences for the self-
perceptions of these soldiers. The two veterans served as a sounding board, for we 
explained our perspective and they gave us their opinions based on their own battlefield 
experiences. Both veterans who were present that day had been deployed in Iraq, and one 
of them was preparing to leave for a deployment to Afghanistan. Their experiences there 
included active combat, and they both had much contact with civilians. 
Once we explained our theoretical framework, we began by asking about the 
deployments that our participants had already completed. From the beginning of the 
discussion, it was clear that there was a difference in the way that soldiers experienced a 
deployment depending on several factors. Primarily, these experiences could vary 
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depending who the soldier dealt with in his or her chain of command and where the 
soldier was stationed during his or her deployment. Despite these differences one aspect 
of their experience was shared by both participants. They talked about the hard balance 
they had to strike between their involvement in development work in Iraq and the ever-
present security concerns. The soldiers explained that having to work on nation building 
brought them in close contact with civilians. At the same time dealing with the ever-
present security issues made for a very awkward relationship with civilians. For example, 
they spoke about situations where soldiers had to patrol the streets or photograph 
buildings for intelligence and reconnaissance missions. Often they would attract groups 
of people who gathered to watch. While the soldiers wanted to be friendly towards these 
people, they were also acutely aware of instances where suicide bombers could lurk in 
the crowd and attack them. They also observed that the same sort of uneasiness was 
possibly felt by the civilians.   
These interactions also opened the door to possible exchanges that could result in 
harm to civilians. According to our participants, training, leadership and the manner in 
which the U.S. presence in Iraq was understood by the soldiers played important roles in 
whether such events take place and how they are perceived. During the discussion it was 
acknowledged that there were situations where poor leadership led to violence against 
civilians. Our participants were of the opinion that there were some battalions that had 
leadership with a poor understanding of the mission and therefore created a “kill, kill, 
kill” mentality among the soldiers. However, they also agreed that these were the 
exceptions.  
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They suggested that the more likely scenario was that the soldiers followed all the 
procedures that were necessary to minimize civilian casualties. The soldiers would warn 
civilians in the area, well ahead of time and several times thereafter, until an operation 
began. This way the soldiers could make sure that they were providing civilians with 
every opportunity to leave the area and avoid being harmed. However, one of the 
participants argued that even though this was done, there were still many situations where 
civilians were mistreated or harmed. For example, U.S. soldiers needed to carry out  
search operations regularly and it was impossible to warn people of them. These 
situations often involved the use of unreasonable force and had the potential to quickly 
lead to situations of mistreatment of civilians. While the discussion on this topic 
remained at a very general level, we attempted to get more details of specific incidents of 
harm that these soldiers themselves may have known about. We also wanted to know 
what feelings and emotions were tied to such events and incidents. However, it became 
very clear that our participants were uncomfortable talking about specific incidents of 
harm. The discussion remained focused on the ambiguity of situations experienced by the 
soldiers and the ever-present dangers from roadside bombings and suicide bombings. As 
we continued to prod them on the question of incidents involving harm to civilians, one 
of our participants began talking about experiencing the stress of constantly feeling 
vulnerable.  
He claimed that all the training can only shield a soldier from the stresses of 
combat to a certain degree. He used the analogy of a sponge. While training helps 
soldiers deal with many of their experiences on the battlefield, each soldier has a 
saturation point beyond which he/she is unable to deal with any more. This is especially 
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so for soldiers who have served in Iraq, as they were continuously and constantly 
required to go out on missions. The constant exposure to high stress combat situations 
does not allow soldiers to have any recovery time or a break from the stress. Therefore, 
they reach this saturation point very quickly, after which it is likely that the stress of the 
next situation would make them overreact.  
It must be noted here that by the time this phase of the discussion began we were 
at the end of the 90 minutes that had been allocated. Our participant mentioned that there 
were several such situations that he does not allow himself to think about. After a little 
encouragement he began to slowly give a brief description of an incident that had taken 
place during the deployment. He said he had accompanied a captain to a meeting with 
two sheiks; the captain had left all his armor and weapons outside the meeting place in 
order to establish trust with the two locals with whom he was meeting. During the 
meeting the sheiks’ bodyguards who were armed got into an argument. Fearing that there 
was a possibility that they would draw their guns and start shooting at each other, the 
soldier used his weapon to attack the two bodyguards with physical blows rather than 
firing at them, which resulted in one of them being seriously injured.  Retrospectively, he 
believes that the likelihood of a shooting incident was minimal. While he did not have to 
suffer any military consequences for his behavior, he seemed genuinely distressed that he 
had used unreasonable force. He said that when he thought about this incident he would 
always think about alternative actions he could have taken. 
 However, the fact that it took 1½ hours to get to this story made it clear that 
veterans would be uncomfortable talking about such incidents in a group, which in turn 
provided us with some explanation for the poor response to our focus group request. 
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Therefore, we decided to explore the same questions using an individual structured 
interview format. I conducted  interviews with five veterans (three of which were 
audiotaped)who volunteered and who, like the participants in the “focus group,” were 
paid $15.00 for their participation. They were all either undergraduate or graduate 
students at UMass, Amherst.  
 The aim of these interviews was again to get feedback on the theoretical model 
we were proposing and to gather evidence supportive (or not) of our theory in the stories 
of their deployments. Of the five participants one had served in Kuwait and four others 
had served in Iraq. Their deployments ranged from a single deployment lasting seven 
months to two deployments that together added up to almost 22 months. They were 
engaged in various tasks during their deployments. Three of them had been involved in 
manning check points, road patrols, driving in convoys and search operations; one said he 
was involved in development work, working to improve educational facilities, and 
another said he worked on transportation of goods and fuel and was also in charge of 
vehicle maintenance.   
 One of the soldiers acknowledged that he had been diagnosed with PTSD. He had 
served in Kuwait and had been involved in transportation and vehicle maintenance. He 
attributed his PTSD diagnosis to a kind of survival guilt that he had felt while he was in 
Kuwait and since returning to the US. He reiterated several times throughout our 
interview that he regretted not being able to get involved in battle and not having had to 
fire a single shot during his deployment. However, as the discussion progressed it also 
became clear that the manner in which he had experienced combat differed greatly from 
that of those who had served in the more active battle theatres of Iraq. Much of his views 
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were formed based on information he seemed to have gathered from others who had 
served in these areas. It may have been colored by an admiration for these soldiers who 
had seen “real combat.”  For example, he suggested that interactions between American 
soldiers and Iraqi civilians had always been friendly and that these civilians were glad 
that the Americans were there: “The Iraqis hadn’t seen mobile phones till we landed 
there…they were glad to see us,” he said. These sentiments were reiterated by him 
throughout our conversation.  However, the other veterans painted a very different picture 
of the interaction between civilians and American troops, one that echoed the view 
expressed by the two veterans in the “focus group.” One soldier said: “I wasn’t sure how 
to react to them,” referring to Iraqi civilians. “The kids would follow us around wherever 
we went. We would wave and they would wave back and shout and laugh. The adults 
always stood back, they were suspicious. They didn’t smile a lot. We were suspicious, 
too.” Another soldier suggested that it was probably hard for Iraqis to have a favorable 
view of the Americans. “We were holding a gun in one hand and waving with the other. 
We must have looked weird. What were they supposed to believe about us?” He also 
believed that many Iraqis were justifiably fearful of American troops and that this may 
have led to the uneasiness around the troops. “We were banging on their doors in the 
middle of the night. There was no way they could see us as a friendly force,” he said. 
 However, when asked about incidents of harm to Iraqi civilians, I saw the same 
reluctance that had been displayed by our “focus group” participants.  In talking about 
such incidents none of the veterans said that they had personally known of a situation 
where a civilian had been killed. However, all of them acknowledged that it was quite 
likely that civilians were harmed and mistreated. “My best friend was deployed at the 
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same time…He’s told me things he had to do when transporting prisoners that would give 
most people nightmares. But he is the kindest, gentlest person. He has a five year old 
daughter and he is great dad.” This type of comment directly addressed the contextual 
basis of different moralities, and when asked about this all our interviewees agreed that 
our model was right in the way it conceptualized the different moral standards. One of 
our participants said: 
 “I think you are on the right track that there are definitely two sets of 
mentalities where soldiers have to create that compartmentalization, 
because honestly you don’t realize what happened over there until you 
return…  When you are over there it’s about the mission. You don’t really 
think about what you do and what happens while you are there because 
you are in that group setting and you are following standard operating 
procedure: what you learned, what you were taught. You are in that soldier 
mode. When you return home and you are in a civilian setting you are not 
amongst your soldiers and your leadership and not vigilant everyday. You 
have the time to think about what went on and what you did and 
somebody is going to start thinking…well maybe I should have done this, 
maybe I should have done this and not that.” 
 While addressing the shift in moral standards this comment also directly 
addressed the idea that often veterans would experience guilt for events that had taken 
place in battle, and that this guilt was most acute once they had returned home. Another 
soldier added in the same vein, “You don’t have the luxury of sitting back and 
contemplating (in the battlefront). I don’t think, in my opinion, the PTSD manifests till 
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soldiers come home and reintegrate into the civilian world with civilian morals and begin 
to think maybe I shouldn’t have shot at that person or maybe I should have waited or 
given them another warning. At the time you have the fight or flight mentality. You want 
to fight, you want to protect your ground and your soldiers.”  
It is fairly evident that while in the battlefield  soldiers were not fully processing events 
that were taking place, but experienced regret, remorse and guilt for their actions once 
they returned home. 
However, as in the “focus group,” they all agreed that incidents of harm to 
civilians were the exception. One of them said, “I don’t think there are many soldiers 
who would see somebody and just start shooting at them, because again you don’t want 
to be that guy who kills innocent civilians.” Another spoke of how he would handle a 
situation that seemed dangerous but was ambiguous: “When you are confronted with 
such a situation you are trying to remember everything that you do. My gut reaction 
would be to bring it up to the rest of the crew. Hey, the person at three o’clock. Is he 
holding a cell phone in his hands? Because I am seeing something. A guy in the middle 
of the desert who is watching our convoy and is not herding sheep or anything--kind of 
sticks out to me.”  
While it was clear that this type of event would result in considerable remorse 
among soldiers, just the idea that what they did was in some way immoral makes it hard 
for these returning veterans to share their stories. Our participants talked about veterans 
being uncomfortable sharing their experiences with anyone. Though they often felt a 
sense of camaraderie when they met other veterans, even in these settings sharing events 
that involved causing harm was very difficult. The veterans would in a manner filter what 
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information about their deployments they would share: “I guess they are sharing what 
they are comfortable sharing. They are not going to talk about the time they ran out in the 
middle of the night to their vehicle and cried …for 30 minutes because of the pressure 
that their chain of command was putting on them.  They are not going to tell you that 
story. They are going to tell you about the goat they ran over because it was too close to 
the road. Or you know the near miss, the truck in front of them got blown up but they 
didn’t. They will only share what they have come to terms with and what they’ve deemed 
in their own minds as being okay.”  
The feeling that they cannot share their experiences is also compounded by the 
sense that civilians may not understand what they have experienced.  “If Joe civilian 
came up and had that same experience, he would freak out. He would judge it with a 
different set of moral judgments. For a soldier it is all in a day’s work,” one veteran 
explained. They also spoke about the feeling that people were ill informed and were not 
interested in understanding the real nature of the war. “I will be in a class and the Middle 
East will come up. Invariably, someone will talk about how our troops are over their 
fighting a war for oil. I am tired of arguing with these kids. They don’t understand.” This 
sort of remark was regarded as derogatory and often made them feel alienated from their 
surroundings. While they believed that they were being treated better than veterans of the 
Vietnam War, they still believed that there was a sense of apathy about missions abroad, 
and this in turn made them feel misunderstood and distanced from society. 
  One of our participants alleged that this was more than just ignorance on the part 
of civilians. He claimed that the authorities and the systems in place did not recognize 
guilt as being an emotion that was associated with their battle experience. He complained 
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that it hasn’t been recognized in the psychological literature, except for survivor guilt. 
Guilt associated with harming another is not taken into consideration in diagnoses. He 
further pointed out that this disregard of guilt was a deliberate political ploy. “If you 
admit guilt over something that means you have been wrong. And politically this is not 
acceptable. Therefore, our soldiers are not allowed to feel guilt.” He went on to say that 
this indeed was a huge disservice to soldiers. He also saw broader implications for a 
society that practices this disregard of guilt. “As a society you become complicit in the 
crimes that your government commits. You become desensitized to it because as a 
society you are not being held accountable.”   
2.1 Discussion 
 Both the two-person “focus group” and the interviews together provided some 
invaluable information about how our model might be manifested in the real world. Our 
interviewees and focus group participants immediately responded positively and 
affirmatively to our proposals. In the focus group as well as the interviews participants 
talked about the different moral standards that exist in the in the battlefront and in civil 
society back home in the U.S. They talked about the battlefield instilling norms about 
making sure that you were holding your ground and protecting your soldiers, while in 
civilian life you are expected to be kind and gentle. In addition to the concerns of keeping 
the soldiers safe, the battlefield also did not provide much respite for actually thinking 
about the events that were taking place. Therefore, coming back affects these soldiers in 
several ways. First they begin to rethink their behavior, because they begin using a 
different set of moral standards and also because they may have  the time to think about 
their experiences in the battlefield. Secondly, their surroundings also affect their 
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perceptions of the events. Many of our participants talked about how they felt that back in 
the U.S. they were unable to discuss their experiences in the battlefield because of fears 
that they might be misunderstood by civilians who are not privy to the situation of the 
battlefield and its demands.  And this inability to share makes them feel alienated and 
distanced from civil society. This is significant because these types of feelings can only 
exacerbate negative effects of their combat experiences.  
 However, it is noted here that I spoke with only a minute sample of veterans, and 
it is possible that what was discussed was unique to their experiences. Therefore, in the 
next study, using the information that we gathered in the “focus group” and the 
interviews, we created a survey to collect information from a broader sample of veterans. 
We were able to collect information from a larger sample, and we assumed that the 
anonymity would allow us to ask more detailed questions about the veterans’ 
experiences.  
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CHAPTER 3 
STUDY 2 
This study further explored the findings of Study 1. It was an attempt to see if we 
could apply what we had learned from our interviews to the broader veteran population 
and to gather more quantifiable data on this topic. The survey was guided by the 
information that we had gathered in the interviews. Not only was this survey based on 
Study 1, we also had veterans who had taken part in the first study involved in 
developing the survey instrument. It consisted of three separate sections that attempted to 
capture details of the soldiers’ deployment, information about interactions with civilians, 
including the perpetration of harm against civilians, and finally a section looking at 
veterans’ responses to these experiences. 
3.1 Method 
Our first attempt to recruit participants for this survey was at the University of 
Massachusetts, Amherst Veterans’ Services office. However, as we once again had a 
poor response to our recruitment email, we decided to collect data online through Mturk. 
We were not surprised at the low response rate on campus, given our experiences with 
the previous study. It was possible that because they would be asked about the 
perpetration of harm, student veterans were afraid to participate as they possibly thought 
the responses could be traced to the participant. Participants on Mturk were compensated 
$0.25 (which is typical for Mturk studies). We specified that only veterans of the U.S. 
armed forces currently in the U.S. were eligible to take part in the study. The survey was 
created on survey monkey and was posted on MTurk.  
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3.1.1 Procedure. Participants completing the survey on MTurk were asked to 
open the survey in a separate window. The first page consisted of a consent form where 
participants were informed of their rights and were cautioned against taking part in the 
study if they had been diagnosed with any psychological difficulties related to their 
combat experience. In order to express their consent to taking part in the study, 
participants were asked to check a box at the bottom of the page. If a participant checked 
the box, s/he was taken to the survey.  
While we invited any American soldier who had been deployed in Iraq and 
Afghanistan to participate in the survey, many of the questions were asked in a manner 
that tapped into the soldiers’ views of American soldiers in general. The section about the 
general experience of their deployment directly addressed the soldier’s own experiences.   
Although our preference would have been to ask about the veterans’ own incidents 
involving harm-doing, our experiences in Study 1 and particularly the recommendations 
of the veterans helping with the survey led us to ask these questions more generally, 
about themselves or other soldiers they know.  Thus our participants could respond based 
on either what they had personally experienced or witnessed or alternatively, based on 
what they had heard about from other soldiers. This would presumably make the survey 
less threatening to our participants and would also encourage make them to respond to 
questions truthfully, as we would not know whether they were referring to themselves or 
other soldiers.  We did not believe that this would invalidate our responses; our 
respondents had experienced combat first hand and per the definition of moral injury by 
Litz et al. (2009), learning about such events from other soldiers can also lead to 
psychological difficulties. From the open-ended responses, it did seem that a number of  
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participants were writing about their own experiences.  For example one soldier wrote, 
“shot it [civilian] with my gun.” There were several examples also of what they 
witnessed: “One of the soldiers hit a kid who was asking for water.” A number of 
participants did not respond to the items that directly asked about harming civilians, but 
nevertheless answered the questions about how veterans reacted to these instances; this 
further complicated interpretation of the data.  Despite these difficulties, we recognized 
that harm-doing would be very sensitive to recall and report for the soldier, so we were 
not willing to focus solely on their own possible mistreatment of civilians. Again, this 
decision was strongly encouraged by the veterans who helped us create the survey. 
3.1.2 Materials. Once the survey was created we received feedback from veterans 
who had taken part in our interviews to streamline the instrument further. As discussed 
earlier, the survey items were divided into several sections. In the first section we asked 
participants questions about their deployments to get a general sense of where they had 
been deployed, how long they had been deployed and what role they had played during 
their deployments. In the second section, the questions were geared at exploring their 
relationship with the civilian population and what type of event led to harmful actions by 
the soldiers. Primarily, we asked how much contact participants had with civilians, how 
they characterized their interactions with the civilians and what emotional reactions they 
had towards the locals. They were asked to choose the two emotions that best described 
their reaction. The emotions included anger, sadness, compassion, sympathy, pity, guilt, 
contempt, disgust, hate, fear, envy and admiration. In these two sections the responses 
had to be based directly on their own experiences. 
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In section three we were interested in particular events of harm. We asked 
participants if they knew of incidents that had resulted in the mistreatment of civilians, 
serious harm to a civilian or the killing of a civilian. We also asked our participants to 
describe the event if they were comfortable doing so. We asked questions about how 
perpetrating harm was experienced by the soldiers while still deployed and then when 
they returned home to the U.S. We asked about the emotions felt, moral judgments of the 
events, impact on self-perceptions, and coping success/failure when confronting the 
event. In order to assess their affective response to the event we used a rating scale 
anchored at 1 (“not at all”) and 7 (“extremely”) for the emotions relief, guilty, angry, 
anxious, sad, happy, regret, shame and fear. To assess the moral judgments of the 
incident we used 7-point bipolar scales with the items immoral–moral, bad–good, wrong–
right and unjustifiable-justifiable. In addition, we also asked participants how the event 
affected their self-perceptions. All these scales were completed twice by the participants, 
once for reactions during the deployment and again, in a subsequent section, for when the 
soldier returned back to the U.S.   Finally, we asked a few demographic questions about 
age and gender and their approval of the Iraq and the Afghanistan wars (see Appendix 2 
for complete survey).   
3.1.3 Participants. A total of 90 veterans responded to our survey. Of these 
veterans 58 had been deployed in Iraq, 30 had been deployed in Afghanistan and 14 had 
been deployed in other places including Qatar, the Gulf, and Vietnam, and one had 
served only in the U.S. To be more consistent in our analyses we removed the three 
participants who said that they had served in Vietnam and the one participant who had 
only served in the U.S.. Looking at the number of times that these soldiers had been 
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deployed, 63% (58 participants) had been deployed once. Another 24 (26%) participants 
said that they had been deployed twice. However there were two participants who said 
that they had been deployed three times and five others who had been deployed four 
times. The number of months cumulatively that each of these veterans had been deployed 
ranged from 3 months to 36 months. However there was one participant who reported 
that he had been deployed for 63 months. He had deployed four times and had served 
both in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
 Our participants ranged in age from 19 to 61 years. In looking at the modal age 
we found that there were two modes – 24 years and 27 years. Our sample consisted of 61 
male veterans and 26 female veterans. In all the analyses that we conducted we examined 
the data for gender differences but did not find any. Therefore, gender will not be 
discussed further. In terms of the duties they carried out during their deployment, 19 were 
involved in search operations, 21 in intelligence, 29 driving in convoys, 8 in media, 21 
worked at checkpoints, 15 in prisoner transport, 12 in development work, 17 in technical 
support, 18 in medical support and 19 in transport. Eight other veterans also said that they 
had engaged in other duties such as airfield security, motor pool and cooking (see Figure 
1).  
3.2 Results 
The main purposes of data analyses were to learn what type of event commonly 
caused harm to civilians, whether there was a difference in the way soldiers felt about 
these events while they were in the battlefield, and when they returned home and how 
they coped with such experiences. 
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We first began by looking at what type of interaction with civilians our 
respondents had had. We also examined how veterans experienced their interaction with 
civilians in general. Responding to the question “How would you describe your 
interactions with civilians?” 58% of the participants (53 participants) said that they were 
cautious but friendly. A total of 21(23%) participants said that they were cautious, 11 
(12%) participants said that they were friendly and 1 (1%) participant said that they were 
hostile. Two participants (2%) said that they had no contact with civilians while one 
participant (1%) said that it ranged from hostile to friendly depending on the situation. 
Furthermore, in terms of the veterans’ emotional reaction to civilians, the most chosen 
responses were sympathy (48 participants or 53%), compassion (32 participants or 35%) 
and sadness (30 participants or 33%).  The number of participants who chose each of the 
other emotions were as follows: fear (22 participants or 24%), pity (21 participants or 
23%), guilt (18 participants or 20%), dislike (16 participants or 17%), anger and 
contempt (14 participants or 15%), admiration (13 participants or 14%), envy (9 
participants or 10%), disgust (8 participants or 8%) and hate (4 participants or 4%). 
Overall, it seemed that our respondents had not had overly negative interactions with 
civilians and did not feel ill will towards them. 
The next step in analyzing the experiences of the soldiers in the battlefield was to 
look at whether they had reported any knowledge of perpetration of harm against 
civilians. In order to explore this we looked at the participants’ responses to the question 
about what they had knew about incidents that caused harm to civilians. A total of 26 
participants said that they had witnessed civilians being mistreated, 19 said that they 
knew of instances where civilians had been harmed and nine said that they knew of 
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instances when civilians were killed (see Figure 2). Overall 41 participants, less than half 
of our respondents, answered this question. We also asked them to describe the event if 
they felt comfortable doing so.  However, only a handful of participants described such 
an incident. Another said that he had witnessed civilians being caught in the crossfire. 
Others described having witnessed a soldier hitting a child who had asked for water, 
soldiers making lewd gestures behind the backs of locals, stealing valuables from a 
person of importance and generally being abusive towards civilians. Two participants 
also said that they did not wish to elaborate on the events that they had witnessed. From 
their comments it was fairly clear that they had witnessed these events firsthand. It should 
be noted that the majority of participants refused to respond to both these questions. We 
believe that this is another example of the reluctance of veterans to speak of these 
incidents. It is interesting that though they did not respond to these questions they still 
continued on to complete the rest of the survey pertaining to the perpetration of harm. In 
order to make sure that those who had not responded to the questions were not 
qualitatively different, we conducted each analysis for all the participants and then for 
just those who had responded to these questions. While there were differences in the 
intensity of their experiences, the patterns of relationship between the variables were 
similar (see below).  
We then looked at whether our respondents perceived differences in the way a 
harmful action was viewed once a soldier had returned from a combat theatre. In order to 
do this, we conducted repeated measures analysis with the emotion measures that were 
used to asses emotional reactions to an event while in combat (time 1) and then when 
they returned to the U.S. (time 2). We found that our prediction that soldiers would feel 
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more guilt and shame when they returned home was supported by these analyses. Thus 
we found that participants believed that soldiers would feel significantly more guilt (F = 
4.23, df = 1, p = .04) and shame (F = 12.33, df = 1, p =.001) after they had returned to the 
US. The mean for guilt for the combat theatre was 3.47 and for when they returned back 
home it was 3.89. For shame we saw a similar pattern; the combat theatre mean was 2.75, 
and the mean for when the soldiers returned was 3.40.  
We also found that our respondents believed soldiers would be significantly more 
relieved (F = 95.44, df = 1, p =.00) when they returned home. They also said that soldiers 
would experience far less anger (F = 16.13, df = 1, p = .00), anxiety (F = 28.05, df = 1, p 
= .00), fear (F = 53.04, df = 1, p = .00), sadness ( F = 7.82, df = 1, p = .006), and more 
happiness (F = 86.53, df = 1, p = .00)  after they returned home (see Table 1 for means). 
In addition to the differences in affect we also looked at possible differences in moral 
judgments about the incident. Keeping with our prediction, repeated measures analyses 
found that veterans thought soldiers would judge the incident significantly more immoral 
(F =8.49, df = 1, p = .005), wrong (F = 7.63, df = 1, p = .007) and bad (F = 6.39, df = 1, p 
= .01) once they returned home from their deployment. The means for the each of these 
items (with lower numbers indicating harsher judgments) were as follows: immoral-
moral (combat M = 4.60; home M = 4.16), wrong-right (combat M = 4.54; home M = 
4.15) and bad–good (combat M = 4.50; home M = 4.11). In addition, we looked at the 
correlations between the emotions of guilt and shame and moral judgments at the same 
time (deployment and home) and across times. Since shame and guilt were correlated at r 
= .60, we combined them at each time point to create guilt/shame composite scores for 
time 1 and time 2.  Further, given that the four moral judgment ratings  were highly 
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correlated, we combined them to create composite moral judgment totals for time 1 and 
time 2.  
We found that higher levels of guilt and shame while being deployed were 
associated with harsher moral judgment at the time (r = -.48, p <.001). A similar pattern 
was seen with the feelings and moral judgments at time 2; again higher levels of guilt and 
shame were associated with harsher moral judgments (r = -.57, p <.001). In addition we 
also found that feelings of guilt and shame while being deployed were associated with 
harsher moral judgments when they returned home (r = .-38, p <.001) and feelings of 
guilt and shame at time 2 were also related to harsher moral judgments of time 1 (r = -
.36, p = .001). However, controlling for guilt and shame at time 1, a regression analysis 
found that guilt and shame at time 2 did not have an effect on moral judgments at time1. 
Similarly, guilt and shame at time 1 did not predict moral judgments at time 2 above and 
beyond feelings of guilt and shame at time 2 (see Table 2 for regression analyses).  
The same pattern of findings were seen when we conducted the regression 
analyses for just participants who reported incidents of harm. We further explored how 
respondents who had reported incidents differed from those who did not respond to these 
questions. Regarding guilt and shame, we found a main effect (F = 9.85, df = 1, p = .000) 
such that overall, those who responded to the question about incidents of harm showed 
lower levels of guilt and shame (M = 2.8) than did those who had not reported such 
incidents (M = 3.9). Further, those who reported incidents of harm were more lenient (M 
=3.99) in their moral judgments than those who did not report such incidents (M = 4.87) 
(F = 8.84, df = 1, p = .004).  
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Regarding self-perceptions, the more immoral respondents believed the incident 
would be judged. The more they believed self-perceptions would change (r = -.23, p = 
.03). Similarly they also thought that the more a soldier thinks about the event the harsher 
they would judge the incident (r = -.31, p =.003). Looking at the overall means for these 
two variables, it was quite clear that both at time 1 and time 2 our respondents believed 
that the incident would change the soldiers self-perceptions somewhat (time 1, M = 2.9; 
time 2 M = 2.9). In terms of how much they believed soldiers would think about the 
event, they again believed that they would do so “sometimes” to a “a lot” (time 1, M = 
3.2; time 2, M = 3.2). 
We also examined whether participants discussed their experiences and with 
whom they did so. A total of 36 participants said that they talked to someone in the chain 
of command, 53 said they spoke to a friend in the military, 18 said they spoke to a friend 
who was not in the military, 37 to their spouses, 23 their parents, 13 their sibling and 37 
said they spoke to a therapist. Two persons said that they had spoken to a chaplain/priest 
while another person said someone who was not involved in their daily lives so that they 
didn’t have to meet the person often.  
Our analyses also looked at how approval for the war affected the responses to 
our main dependent variables. It must be noted that approval for both the Iraq (M = 3.47) 
and the Afghan wars (M = 3.78) were around the mean of the scale. Interestingly we 
found that lower approval of the Iraq war was associated with higher levels of perceived 
guilt (r = -.34, p = .00), perceived shame (r = -.25, p = .02) and perceived anger (r = -27, 
p = .01) at time 2. However, we did not see the same relationship for the guilt, shame and 
anger that they felt while deployed. Similarly, lower approval of the Afghan war was 
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associated with higher levels of perceived guilt (r = -.44, p = .00), perceived shame (r = -
.21, p = .04) and perceived anger (r = -38, p = .00) after veterans returned home. 
However, lower approval for the Afghan war was also associated with higher levels of 
perceived guilt (r = -.28, p = .00) and perceived shame (r = -.30, p = .04) even while they 
were still deployed. 
3.3 Discussion 
This survey proved useful in furthering our understanding of the impact that 
harm-doing  during a deployment has on a soldier.  As predicted, our respondents 
indicated that while still deployed soldiers felt less guilt and shame than when they 
returned back home. They also stated that soldiers were likely to feel more relieved and 
happy when they returned, and would be less angry, anxious, less fearful and less sad 
about the event than when they were still deployed.  Interestingly, then, as might be 
expected. most emotions moved in the positive direction once the soldiers left the war 
theatre; the two exceptions were shame and guilt, which increased once the they returned 
home. We also found that the harm-doing behavior was judged more harshly i.e., 
perceived as  more immoral) when soldiers returned home than when they were still 
deployed. This supports our prediction that context based morality may be impacting how 
harm-doing is perceived. It does seem that different standards were being used to judge 
the behavior in the different contexts.  
The complexity of dealing with harm caused in the battlefield is evident from the 
fact that the majority of our participants chose not to answer the specific questions about 
the harmful incident even though they went on to complete the rest of the survey, 
entirely. In addition, this might have been compounded by the fact that they were 
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responding to a survey from someone they did not know at all. It was clear from 
responses that our participants were most comfortable talking about such events with 
either someone in the military or their closest family members. Therefore, perhaps it is 
not surprising that they were reluctant to divulge such information in this survey. 
Interestingly, we also found that lower approval for the Iraq and Afghan war was 
associated with higher levels of guilt, shame and anger when soldiers returned home. 
This is also not surprising because it is quite possible that if they do not believe in the 
mission, they have no way of rationalizing their behavior. However, it was also found 
that lower support for the Afghan war was associated with higher levels of guilt and 
shame during the deployment itself. Generally we found that there was much less 
approval of the Iraq war than the one in Afghanistan among our participants. This is also 
a reflection of the general social discourse about the war in the U.S. The war in 
Afghanistan is generally seen as the just war, while the Iraq war is seen less favorably. 
There were several comments about this in the comments section that made it clear that 
our participants were thinking in the same manner. One soldier said “We had no business 
getting involved in Iraq the way we did. The American public was duped.” Therefore, it 
is possible that those who have lower levels of approval for the Afghan war were in 
general less positively disposed towards the idea of war, conflict and violence and 
therefore were more likely to see such situations as guilt and shame provoking.  
The most significant shortcoming in this study was that we were unable to 
pinpoint exactly who had perpetrated the harm-doing that was reported.  Responses to 
open-ended questions suggested that participants were responding based on incidents 
they were involved in either as the person perpetrating the harm or someone witnessing 
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the harm being perpetrated. In the latter case we could not be certain if they were 
responding based on feelings associated with being a witness or based on what they 
thought the perpetrator was experiencing. To complicate the situation, since participants 
had the choice of not responding to this question, and many of them didn’t; we were not 
able to gauge whose experiences were the source for their responses to the items in the 
remainder of the survey. Those who did not respond to the harm-doing questions reported 
higher levels of guilt and shame a soldier would feel and harsher moral judgments as 
well.  It is not clear whether these were overestimates of others’ responses or accurate 
reports of their own (or others’) experiences that they were unwilling to divulge directly. 
However, it must be noted that both groups—those who did and did not report harm-
doing--believed that both at time 1 and 2 soldiers would experience considerable guilt 
and shame, and both groups viewed the perpetration of harm as fairly immoral. However, 
the fact that we were still able to find the evidence supportive of our predictions in this 
study, despite our recruitment requirements (not being diagnosed with PTSD) essentially 
left out those who were most likely to have engaged in harm-doing, was still impressive.  
The most heartening aspect of this study was the comments we received from our 
participants. While it must be noted that only a few of our respondents added comments, 
we did not receive a single negative comment. They were in general very encouraging 
and supportive of our research. One veteran wrote, “Good survey. Hope it helps with 
helping the men and women who will never be the same due to these wars!!!” Another 
said “It was a good survey for soldiers and loved ones of soldiers to take.” “Thank you 
for conducting this and asking important questions,” said another in the comments 
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section. These sentiments were very encouraging to read and validated the importance of 
our attempts to understand the experiences of these veterans. 
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CHAPTER 4 
          STUDY 3 
Following from the previous studies, the aim of Study 3 was to isolate why our 
veteran reported that self-perceptions were impacted negatively when they returned 
home. We predicted that context based morality would be key to understanding this 
phenomenon. Using a description of a combat situation we elicited either interpersonal or 
intergroup moral standards and then examined if harm-doing in an intergroup situation 
was seen as less immoral than in the interpersonal situation. 
4.1 Method 
The study design was a 2 (interpersonal vs. intergroup moral standard saliency) X 
2 (ingroup vs. outgroup harmdoer) with a separate control condition that represented a 
default moral standard. This default condition made interpersonal moral standards salient, 
but signified a default standard in that it was set in an urban environment rather than a 
war setting.  We expected to find the least harsh judgments in the intergroup moral 
condition where the harmdoer was  of the ingroup and the harshest punishments in the 
outgroup interpersonal harmdoer condition. The order of the different conditions in terms 
of the harshness of the punishments was expected to be as follows: outgroup 
interpersonal harmdoing, ingroup interpersonal harmdoing, outgroup intergroup 
harmdoing and  ingroup intergroup harm doing. Additionally, we predicted that the 
harshest of all judgments would be seen in the default condition, outside of the war 
setting. 
4.1.1 Materials. In order to create a scenario that would involve harm to civilians, 
we used an excerpt from the book Collateral Damage: American’sWar Against Iraqi 
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Civilians (2009) by Chris Hedges and Laila Al-Arian. The excerpt described the 
uncertainty that soldiers felt while they were standing at a checkpoint and their reaction 
to an incident when a car did not stop when the soldiers ordered it to do so. In this study 
we used scenarios to manipulate the perpetrator’s group identity and interaction type. In 
order to manipulate ingroup and ourgroup, participants read that the incident either took 
place at a American checkpoint in Iraq or at a Russian checkpoint in Chechnya (see 
Appendix 3 for scenarios). In the interpersonal interaction condition, intended to make 
interpersonal moral standards salient, the perpetrator was described as a soldier manning 
the checkpoint. We attempted to individuate the soldier and the victim by providing 
personal information about them, such as names, and by describing their thoughts and 
feelings during the events. In the group interaction conditions, intended to make 
intergroup moral standards salient, the perpetrators were a group of soldiers manning the 
checkpoint. The soldier who fired at the civilian was not identified and no individuating 
information about the soldiers or the victim were included.  In the separate fifth 
condition, the perpetrator was described as an off-duty police officer who was standing 
by a barricade set up at the scene of a drive-by shooting incident; the victim as someone 
who was driving toward the barricade and failed to stop.  
Participants then responded to a number of scale items to gauge their responses to 
the incident and the judgments of the harmdoer. The first items in the questionnaire dealt 
with participants’ judgments of the perpetrator and the victim. Participants were asked 
how good / bad the soldier was, how moral / immoral the soldier was, how justified the 
soldier was in shooting at the civilian, how much the soldier should be punished, how 
much the soldier is to blame for the civilians death, how much the driver is to blame for 
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the death, how much empathy the participants felt toward the soldier, how much empathy 
the participants felt toward the driver, how guilty the soldier felt, and how much guilt the 
soldier should feel. In addition, participants also completed  polar scale indicating their 
affective responses to the event. Participants were asked to rate their affective responses 
to the event using a scale anchored at 1 (“not at all”) and 7 (“extremely”) for angry, sad, 
guilty,  proud, disgusted, ashamed, surprised, and  fear. Similarly they also completed 
another set of 7-point bipolar scales about their perceptions of the soldier’s behavior. The 
items were immoral–moral, bad–good, wrong-right, unacceptable-acceptable, 
inexcusable–excusable, dishonest–honest, irresponsible–responsible, and uncommon–
common. Finally participants also completed a brief demographic questionnaire that 
included information about age, gender, ethnicity, religion, years of schooling and 
political affiliation.   
4.1.2 Procedure. Once participants had read and signed the consent form they 
were provided with a packet containing the study material. Participants read the event 
description and completed the questionnaire. They were then debriefed and thanked for 
their participation.  
4.2 Results 
 As a precursor to the main analyses, we created composite scores for our main 
dependent variables. The six negative affect items (angry, sad, fear, disgust, ashamed and 
guilty) formed a reliable scale (α = .80) and were therefore combined to form the 
Negative Emotion scale. A  Moral Total scale was also created (α =.88) and included 
immoral–moral, bad–good, wrong--right, unacceptable--acceptable, inexcusable–
excusable, and irresponsible–responsible. The pairs “dishonest–honest” and 
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“uncommon–common” were not included in the scale, as they exhibited low inter-item 
correlations and decreased the scale reliability.  
 The following items, anchored 1 (“not at all) to 9 (“extremely), were combined 
into a single Soldier Judgment scale (α = .85): “How justified was(were) the 
soldier(s)/police officer shooting at the car?”; “In your opinion how good or bad would 
you rate the soldier’s (soldiers’)/police officer’s behavior?”; “In your opinion how moral 
or immoral would you rate the soldier’s (soldiers’)/police officer’s behavior?”; “In your 
opinion do you think the soldier(s)/police officer should be punished? (reverse-scored)”; 
“How empathic do you feel toward the soldier(s)/police officer? (reverse-scored)”; and 
“How blameworthy do you think the soldier(soldiers)/ police officer is(are) for the 
death?” 
 The two items related to perceptions of the driver (i.e., the victim)--“How 
empathic do you feel toward the driver?” and “How blameworthy do you think the driver 
is for the death?”-- were analyzed separately because of the low inter-item correlations. 
In addition, the two items of guilt judgment “How guilty do you think the 
soldier(s)/police officer feels about the death of the woman?” and “ How guilty do you 
think the soldier(s)/police officer should feel?” were also analyzed separately because 
they were considered orthogonal (and were in fact uncorrelated).  
Correlations between the major dependent variables are reported in Table 3.  We 
found that the variables were correlated in expected patterns. For example it was found 
that the higher participants scored on Soldier Judgment the more guilty they believed the 
soldier should feel (r = -.5, p < .01) and lower scores on Soldier Judgment were also 
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associated with more blame to the driver (r = -.41, p <.01) and the lower levels of 
empathy with the driver (r = -.35, p <.01). 
 The main analyses were first conducted as 2 (interpersonal vs. intergroup context) 
X 2 (ingroup vs. other group) ANOVAs.  We did not find any significant differences on 
the Negative Emotions scale or the Moral Judgment scale. However an exploration of 
single emotion items found a main effect of context (interpersonal vs. intergroup) on fear 
(F = 4.43, df = 1, p = .03). It appeared that participants reading the interpersonal 
interaction were more fearful (M = 3.3) than those reading the intergroup interaction (M = 
2.5). In addition, perpetrator group affiliation had a significant effect on scores for the 
disgust item (F = 8.02, df = 1, p = .005). This was an intergroup bias effect, with those 
reading about an outgroup perpetrator reporting more disgust (M = 3.8) than those 
reading about an ingroup perpetrator (M = 2.7).  
Most important, there was a significant main effect for how guilty the participants 
thought the soldier felt (F = 11.16, df = 1, p = .001). Participants for whom the 
interpersonal context was salient felt that the soldier felt more guilty (M = 7.8) than those 
for whom the intergroup context was salient (M = 6.8). Further, for the item “How guilty 
do you think the soldier(s)/police officer should feel?” participants showed a main effect 
for whether the perpetrator was an ingroup or outgroup member (F = 6.21, df = 1, p = 
.014). Participants who read that the perpetrator was an ingroup member responded with 
lower scores (M = 6.9) than those who read about an outgroup  perpetrator (M = 7.9). 
This first set of analyses did not include the default condition of the police officer 
shooting at a car. Therefore, we conducted one-way ANOVAs that included all five 
conditions (ingroup–interpersonal, ingroup–group, outgroup–interpersonal, outgroup– 
 53 
 
group and the default condition) which allowed us to compare each condition to the 
other.  An analysis of the Soldier Judgment revealed that the conditions differed on how 
immoral they rated the harmdoer (F = 5.27, df = 2, p = .006). Post hoc analyses showed 
that that default condition belonged to  the subset of the harshest judgment, and they 
differed from the other three conditions, ingroup –interpersonal, outgroup interpersonal 
and ingroup - group. The outgroup group condition was seen in both these subsets.  A 
similar pattern of findings emerged for Moral Total (F = 3.4, df = 4, p = .01). Again post 
hoc analyses found that the default condition and the outgroup–group condition were 
clustered together and ingroup-interpersonal, ingroup group, outgroup – interpersonal and 
outgroup – group conditions also formed the other subset. Therefore, it seemed that the 
default condition resulted in harsher judgments than did the other four conditions. 
Finally, the five conditions also differed also on the single item “How guilty do you think 
the soldier/police officer feels,”  (F = 10.69, df = 2, p = .001). Post hoc analyses found 
that ingroup–group, outgroup–group and outgroup–interpersonal conditions did not differ 
from one another, but did differ from the default condition and ingroup–interpersonal 
condition clustered together     
4.3 Discussion  
 This study revealed some evidence of the use of context based morality in making 
judgments about the perpetration of harm. Most interesting was the findings regarding 
how participants understood the feelings of the harmdoer. In keeping with our predictions 
and replicating the information provided by the participants in studies 1 and 2, we found 
that participants who read the interpersonal context scenario believed that the harmdoer 
felt guiltier than the harmdoer in the intergroup context scenario. There seems to be an 
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implicit understanding that in the interpersonal context the perpetrator used a moral 
standard that was less accepting of causing harm to others, while the harmdoer in the 
intergroup context used a moral standard that allowed him to assuage guilt that resulted 
from his behavior. 
 While we did not see a significant difference overall in the negative emotions felt 
by the participants towards the harmdoer, we did find that moral context had an effect on 
fear. Participants reading the interpersonal interaction reported feeling more fear than did 
those reading the intergroup interaction. Someone who harms others in general is not 
good for group living, either from a survival point of view or a group cohesion point of 
view, and is apt to engender fear. However, in the intergroup context, having someone 
willing to cause harm for the group’s protection can be regarded as beneficial to the 
group. Therefore, this finding is consistent with our general theoretical framework.  
The data did not show that participants’ blame of the harmdoer, at least in the war 
situation, waswere impacted by the differential use of interpersonal and intergroup moral 
standards. However, it should be noted that the default condition harmdoer (police 
officer) was consistently judged significantly more negatively than the harmdoer in the 
interpersonal or  intergroup contexts. This may still provide some support for our 
hypothesis that interpersonal and intergroup moral standards are used differentially to 
make judgments of a harmdoer.  War situations, even if the targets involved are 
dramatically individuated, still primes some degree of groupiness, whereas the default 
condition we used was clearly a situation where our basic interpersonal moral standards 
would operate. Not finding judgments impacted by the interpersonal moral standards in 
the interpersonal context could be an artifact of this embedded groupiness. The fact that 
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the target in the default condition was treated more harshly than those in the war related 
conditions also reveals an interesting fact. It seems that war automatically institutes a 
moral environment where the rules are less harsh regarding harming others, even if the 
context in this environment is interpersonal in nature.    
 We also found a general intergroup bias where participants reported that they felt 
more disgust when they read information about an outgroup harmdoer, and the same 
pattern was seen in response to how much guilt participants believed the harmdoer should 
feel. However, it is also interesting that this bias was only seen in these two items and not 
more. It augurs well for our contention that be it an ingroup or an outgroup, harm is 
generally judged more leniently in intergroup situations than in an interpersonal 
interaction. Further it also replicates the findings of our previous two studies. 
 However, a limitation of the study was that we were not able to get moral 
judgments of the soldier to change based on the type of interaction. While it was clear 
that interpersonal moral standards were being used in the default moral condition, we 
were not able to demonstrate this difference in the context of war. Presumably this could 
be because war in itself is an intergroup interaction situation and therefore it might be 
difficult to perceive as an interpersonal interaction as such. Secondly, due to the current 
climate of awareness that the U.S. is involved in two wars overseas and recognition of the 
personal sacrifice these soldiers have undergone to serve the country, participants might 
find it difficult to judge them as being less than moral.  
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CHAPTER 5 
STUDY 4 
While we had some experimental evidence for the differential use of interpersonal 
and intergroup moral standards in Study 3, it was based on moral judgments made by 
others. However, as discussed in the introduction, self-blame may be critical to the 
psychological impact of harm-doing. Further, given the possible reluctance to blame 
American soldiers (i.e., those fighting for us), it seemed possible that substituting the self 
for others might allow for greater attributions of blame.  Therefore, in this study in 
addition to differences in moral judgments made with interpersonal and intergroup moral 
standards, we also explored whether judgments of harm-doing differed for the self and 
another. 
5.1 Method 
Study 4 was conducted as a 2 (recall context: battlefront/home) X 2 (judgment; 
self/other) between subjects experiment. Using a brief description of a combat incident 
that was set in the streets of Iraq (see Appendix 4), we tried to examine if there were 
differences in how a perpetration of harm was judged on the battlefront and when the 
soldier returned home. In addition we also investigated differences in moral judgments of 
the self and others. The scenario was set either in a bunker in the battlefront (combat) or a 
bar (civil society). The assumption was that when participants read about the soldier in a 
bunker, intergroup moral standards would emerge; reading about the soldier who had 
returned home would produce interpersonal moral standards. We hypothesized that under 
conditions of intergroup moral standards, the behavior would to be judged less harshly 
than in the situation where interpersonal moral standards were salient. In addition the 
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questionnaire also manipulated if our participants were making these judgments about 
themselves or others. As discussed earlier, looking glass self-perceptions mean that 
generally people will judge themselves based on how they believe others judge them. 
Given the unique nature of the experience we are asking them to imagine, it is possible 
that participants may use interpersonal moral standards throughout, whereas when they 
are making judgments about a soldier, the soldier may always be seen as engaging in 
intergroup actions, which leads to more lenient judgments. In order to explore these 
hypotheses we asked the participants to make judgments about the harmful behavior 
either for themselves or as a third person observer. 
5.1.1 Participants. A total of 113 (78 female and 34 male) students from UMass, 
Amherst took part in the study for extra class credit. The sample was predominantly 
White (70%) and ranged in age from 18 to 34 years.  
5.1.2 Materials. Participants first read an adapted version of the scenario used in 
study 3. The first brief section outlined the ambiguity and the tenseness of the battlefield. 
They then completed a set of five anagrams. These anagrams, we hoped, would create 
some temporal distance between the two parts of the experimental material that the 
participants were required to read. Creating this temporal distance seemed especially 
important when trying to establish interpersonal morals – that is, when the target 
experienced the event in the battlefield but was recalling it in a civilian setting (back in 
the US).  
After the anagrams half of the participants received a description of a soldier 
recalling the event in a bunker (intergroup moral conditions) while the other half had a 
description of the soldier recalling the event after returning home (interpersonal morals 
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condition). Participants then responded to a number of scale items to gauge their 
responses to the incident and their judgments of the harmdoer. The first items in the 
questionnaire dealt with participant judgments of the perpetrator and the victim. 
Participants were asked how good/bad the soldier was, how moral/immoral the soldier 
was, how justified the soldier was in shooting at the civilian, how much the soldier 
should be punished, how much the soldier is to blame for the civilians death, how much 
the driver is to blame for the death, how much empathy the participants felt toward the 
soldier, how much empathy the participants felt toward the driver, how guilty the soldier 
felt and how ashamed the soldier felt. In addition, participants also indicated their 
affective responses to the event using 7-point scales anchored “not at all” to “extremely” 
for angry, sad, guilty, proud, disgusted, ashamed, surprised, and fear. They also 
completed 7- point bipolar scale regarding their perceptions of the soldier’s behavior. The 
items were immoral–moral, bad–good, wrong--right, unacceptable--acceptable, 
inexcusable–excusable, dishonest–honest, irresponsible–responsible, uncommon–
common. The final part of the experimental material was a demographic questionnaire 
that included in questions about age, gender, ethnicity, religion, amount of schooling and 
political affiliation (see Appendix 4 for complete material). 
 In order to compare responses for the self vs. another, when responding to these 
measures participants were asked either: 1) to imagine that they were the soldier 
engaging in the shooting of a civilian and to  respond to the measures accordingly or 2) to  
respond to the stimuli as a third person reading about the event. By doing this we were 
able to manipulate self- perceptions and other- perceptions. For example in the self-
perception condition participants were asked if they were justified in shooting at the 
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civilian, while in the other-perception condition they were asked if they thought the 
soldier was justified in shooting at the civilian.  Finally they also completed a 
demographic questionnaire that included questions about age, gender, ethnicity, religion, 
and political affiliation.  
5.1.3 Procedure. Participants were brought into the lab and were asked to first 
sign a consent form. They were then given the study materials. Participants were 
instructed to try their best to complete all the anagrams. However anyone who completed 
at least three of them were included in the analyses. It was not important that they 
completed the anagrams; rather we were more concerned that they spent adequate time 
between reading the two sections. We believed that by merely spending time on trying to 
complete the anagrams, participants would automatically create the temporal distance 
between the two parts. Once they had completed the study materials  they were debriefed 
and thanked for their participation.  
5.2 Results  
We began our analysis by combining items for the different measures to create 
subscale scores. We computed a Negative Emotion score using the  items angry, sad, 
fear, disgust, ashamed and guilty (α = .88). The single item “proud” stood independently.  
The bipolar items measuring the morality of the target’s behavior were analyzed and it 
was found that the items “dishonest–honest” and “uncommon–common” again showed 
low inter-item reliability. Therefore the items immoral–moral, bad–good, wrong–right, 
unacceptable– cceptable, inexcusable–excusable and irresponsible–responsible were 
combined to create a Moral Total score (α = .90). The items dishonest–honest and 
uncommon–common were also analyzed  separately. To compute a Soldier Judgment 
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score we combined the items: “How justified was the soldier shooting at the car?”; “In 
your opinion how good or bad would you rate the soldier’s behavior?”; “In your opinion 
how moral or immoral would you rate the soldier’s/your behavior?”; “In your opinion do 
you think the soldier/you should be punished? (reverse scored)” and “ How blameworthy 
do you think the soldier is/you are for the death? (reverse scored).”  A reliability analysis 
showed that this was reliable at α = .79. The items “How empathic do you feel you feel 
toward the driver?” and “How blameworthy do you think the driver is for the death?” as 
well as “How guilty do you think (you / the soldier) feel(s) about the death of the 
woman?” and “How ashamed do you think (you / the soldier) feel(s) about the death of 
the woman?” were analyzed separately. 
The main analyses – univariate analyses with context of recall (battlefield / home) 
and perspective (self / other) – were conducted for the main dependent variables (Moral 
Total, Soldier Judgment, Negative Emotion and the single items.  Although differences 
were not found based on moral context, a number of differences arose based on self-other 
perspective.  The analysis for the single item “How guilty do you think (you / the soldier) 
feel(s)” found a main effect of perspective (F = 6.62, df = 1, p =.01), with participants in 
the self- perception condition believing that on average they would feel guiltier (M = 
7.06) than they thought another person would feel (M = 6.15). The same pattern of 
findings was also found for the single item “How ashamed do you think the soldier 
feels…” (F = 6.17, df = 1, p = .01) with those in the self condition believing that they as 
the soldier would feel more shame (M = 6.4) than the soldier when they made a third 
person judgment (M = 5.4). 
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 Participants were also likely to say that they felt significantly more Negative 
Emotion when they imagined themselves in the situation (M = 5.0) than when they were 
making judgments about how the soldier would feel (M = 3.3)  (F = 41.3, df = 1, p = .00). 
Similarly, when participants imagined that they were the soldier, they were also 
significantly less positive in their judgments about the soldier than when they were 
making judgments about the soldier as a third person (F = 24.3, df = 1, p =.00). When 
they imagined that they were the soldier the mean for the Soldier judgment was M = 3.7 
and when they were making judgments about the soldier as a third person, the mean was 
M = 5.2 (see Table 5 for summary). 
5.3 Discussion 
The key finding in this study was the manner in which participants were harsher 
judging themselves than when judging others. This was a pattern that was seen on three 
of the four main dependent variables. When participants were asked to imagine that they 
were the soldier, participants tended to be harsher in their judgments of the soldier’s 
behavior, thought they would feel more guilt and shame, and felt more negative emotions 
about the behavior than when they were judging the behavior as a third person. The 
findings suggest that moral transgressions by the self were considered more heinous and 
worthy of outrage than the same moral transgression by another person, specifically 
another soldier. These findings may reflect a combination of different factors. They may 
be connected to the fact that we derive much of our self worth from seeing ourselves as 
being moral. As discussed in the introduction we also believe that we are more moral 
than the average person. This may mean that we hold ourselves to a higher moral 
standard, and thus behaving in a manner that causes harm to another is regarded as 
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extreme and unthinkable. It affects the core of who we are; knowing that one has 
committed a moral transgressionmay elicit a harsh response and more negative emotion. 
However, on the contrary it was also possible that we are unwilling to acknowledge such 
transgression and thus there may be other reasons for this findings.   
The difference in the manner the self is judged in comparison to another also 
raises another interesting possibility. We could argue that interpersonal and intergroup 
moral standards are being used differentially to make these judgments. It appears that 
perhaps in the case of the self, participants are using interpersonal moral standards. When 
imagining the self in such a situation, participants are thinking about how they personally 
interact with the world. When the self is made salient, it precludes the emergence of 
intergroup moral standards but facilitates interpersonal moral standards. However, it is 
much easier to imagine a soldier who is serving his country, a soldier as a part of a group. 
The default in such a situation is intergroup moral standards. This could be responsible 
for the harsher judgments and the negative affect associated with self-perceptions, while 
the other is treated more leniently. However, this idea requires further study. Both in 
Study 3 and 4 we were not able to find clear evidence for how the judgments of soldiers 
by others are impacted by interpersonal and intergroup moral standards. This maybe an 
artifact of using combat related material, and so in the next study we decided to abandon 
the use of such material and turn to  more mundane transgressions. 
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CHAPTER 6 
STUDY 5 
6.1 Method  
In the current study we created material using an example of academic cheating. 
This material was well suited to manipulating interpersonal and intergroup moral 
standards and had the added benefit of being very relevant and familiar to our 
participants. The study was conducted as a between subjects experiment with two 
conditions based on who presumably benefited from the cheating-- the individual or the 
group.  
6.1.1 Materials. The experimental material included a brief description of an 
incident of academic cheating. The short paragraph described how the student has 
plagiarized well over half of his paper from a published source. In one form participants 
were told that even though students were divided into groups, each student would get an 
individual grade while in the other participants were told that students were working in a 
group and that the whole group would get one grade. In responding to the accusation, the 
target in question in the individual condition said that he had been busy and had only 
plagiarized to get a good grade. In the other condition, the student was reported as saying 
that he had been busy and had only plagiarized to make sure that the group grade did not 
suffer. Participants were then asked to respond to the following scale items which were 
anchored 1 (“not at all”) to 9 (“extremely): “How justified do you think John was in 
plagiarizing the paper?” “How blameworthy do you think John was for plagiarizing the 
paper?” “How guilty do you think John was about plagiarizing the paper?” “How 
ashamed do you think John was about plagiarizing the paper?” “How guilty do you think 
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John should feel about plagiarizing the paper?” and “How ashamed do you think John 
should be about plagiarizing the paper?”   
 To gauge how our participants viewed the target we also used a scale anchored 1 
(“not at all”) to 7   (“extremely”) with the adjectives Competent, Sociable, Well-
intentioned, Skillful, Trustworthy, Good-natured, Friendly, Confident, Moral, Warm, 
Intelligent and Honest. Based on prior research (Usoof-Thowfeek, Janoff-Bulman and 
Tavernini, 2011) we grouped these adjectives to create three separate subscales: 
Competence (Competent, Skillful, Confident and Intelligent,α = .57), Morality (Well-
intentioned, Trustworthy, Moral and Honest, α = .68) and Warmth (Sociable, Good-
natured, Friendly and Warm, = .69)). We also included bipolar 7-point scales to assess  
how participants judged the incident of cheating. The items were immoral–moral, wrong–
right, bad–good, unacceptable–acceptable, inexcusable–excusable, dishonest–honest and 
irresponsible – responsible. These items were combined to create a Moral Total score (α 
= .89). Participants also completed a brief demographic questionnaire which asked about 
age, gender, ethnicity, religion and political affiliation. 
6.1.2 Participants.   A total of 50 participants from the University of 
Massachusetts, Amherst took part in our study. Our participants ranged from ages 18 to 
23 years and included 29 females and 21 males. A total of 33 participants identified as 
White. 
6.1.3 Procedure. Participants came into the laboratory and were asked to sign a 
consent form. They were then given the experimental materials and once they had 
completed this they were debriefed and thanked for their participation.  
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6.2 Results 
The primary analyses for this study took the form of one-way ANOVAs 
(conditions: individual vs. group). The main dependent variables were Moral Total, 
Competence, Morality and Warmth and the single items: “How guilty do you think John 
feels about plagiarizing the paper?; “How ashamed do you think John feels about 
plagiarizing the paper?”; “How guilty do you think the John should feel about 
plagiarizing the paper?”; and “How ashamed do you think John should feel about 
plagiarizing the paper?” 
We found that participants in the individual condition saw the behavior as less 
justified (M = 1.86) than those in the group condition (M = 2.7) (F = 4.1, df = 1, p =.04). 
Participants in the individual condition also saw the target as being more blameworthy 
(M = 8.6) than those in the group condition (M = 8.0) (F = 3.8, df =1, p = .05). Further, 
participants in the individual condition also felt that the target should feel more guilty (M 
= 7.2) than those in the group condition (M = 6.8) (F = 3.9, df = 1, p = .05). While 
participants in the two conditions did not see the participants significantly different on the 
dimensions of Warmth and Competence, they did differ in how they judged the person on 
Morality. Individual condition participants judged the participant as being more immoral 
(M = 2.2) than those in the group condition (M = 3.2) (F = 16.6, df = 1, p <.000). 
Furthermore, this was also reflected in the Moral Total. Participants in the individual 
condition saw the behavior as more immoral (M = 1.5) than did those in the group 
condition (M = 2.2) (F = 3.89, df = 1, p = .05) (see Table 6 for summary means). 
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6.3 Discussion 
The current study demonstrated some interesting findings in terms of the 
judgments based on interpersonal and intergroup moral standards.  When the target was 
described as having committed the same transgression on behalf of his group rather than 
to benefit the self, participants saw the behavior as less immoral and the target as less 
blameworthy, requiring less guilt and resulting in perceptions of greater. Interestinglu, 
this was the case even though the behavior in the group condition was actually more 
likely to harm others directly – that is lower grades of others in the plagiarist’s group. 
This suggests that participants were using different standards to judge the target 
depending on whether he was seen engaging in the behavior to benefit the group or doing 
it for himself. This provides clearer evidence for context based moral standards. 
However, we need to acknowledge that in general the behavior in the group 
condition was still seen as immoral and the target was still not regarded as very justified, 
but instead was seen in general as blameworthy and worthy of feeling guilty, as reflected 
by the means for the main dependent measure. There wasn’t a shift from immoral to 
moral based on the situation, but  participants were more likely to excuse the behavior 
because of group morals.  
Of course cheating on a paper is obviously qualitatively very different from 
perpetrations of harm during war. They differ both in the consequences and the intensity 
of harm. Further, war is an inherently intergroup conflict situation. In the current study 
the group condition involved  ingroup benefit to the group, but not conflict between 
groups. The harm from cheating is generally about flouting societal norms rather than 
specific harm to another. However, we do have to acknowledge that these type of 
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transgressions and their consequences are very real to our participants. Notwithstanding 
the limitations in comparing academic cheating to perpetration of harm in combat, these 
findings nevertheless demonstrate the use of context based moral standards and the fact 
we could demonstrate the impact of intergroup morals in the absence of conflict is 
noteworthy.  
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CHAPTER 7 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Taken together, these five studies provide us with some insights into how 
perpetrations of harm affect soldiers returning from war and how context based morality 
may in part help explain  these effects. All of the U.S. veterans with whom we discussed 
our model, both in the interviews and in the focus group, unanimously agreed with our 
proposition that there was a difference in the way an incident of harm would be 
experienced and judged while being deployed versus when they returned home to the 
U.S.. They agreed that this was because of the shift in moral standards with which the 
behavior was being judged. The survey with veterans enabled us to replicate what our 
veterans had described in terms of the differences in the affective response and moral 
judgments of incidents of harm. Our analyses showed that our veterans believed that 
when a soldier returned home negative feelings of guilt and shame associated with 
incidents of harm were felt more strongly than while they were still deployed.  
Furthermore, we also found that our veterans believed that the behavior would be seen as 
more immoral when a soldier returned home than while deployed. This supports our 
contention that while deployed soldiers are using intergroup moral standards and 
therefore incidents of harm may not seem as drastic as they do when they return home 
and revert to the default interpersonal moral standards.  
These findings received some further support from our experimental findings. We 
saw that participants had an understanding that soldiers would feel more guilt under 
conditions of interpersonal morality. In study 3 using combat scenarios that manipulated 
either interpersonal or intergroup morality, both for ingroups and outgroups, we were 
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able to demonstrate that participants were aware that soldier s in situations in which 
interpersonal moral standards are salient feel more guilt for causing harm than they 
would in a similar intergroup situation. In the same study we also compared these 
conditions with a transgression of the default interpersonal moral standard which was 
situated in civil society. We found that this condition yielded the harshest judgments. It 
allowed us to overcome some of the difficulties of trying to demonstrate interpersonal 
transgressions in a situation (war / combat) that is inherently an intergroup interaction. 
However, the fact that we were able to demonstrate differences between how an 
interpersonal and intergroup moral transgression was felt (i.e., in terms of presumed guilt 
and shame) in an inherently intergroup situation augurs well for the strength of this 
phenomena. We were also able to demonstrate this phenomenon using the more mundane 
example of academic cheating that again allowed us to overcome dealing with the 
complexities of using combat situations for our experimental material. We were able to 
clearly demonstrate both higher levels of guilt and shame and negative moral judgments 
of a transgression in an interpersonal context in comparison to a group context. 
Also, it was fairly clear that when asked to imagine themselves being involved in 
harm-doing participants were much tougher on themselves than when they were asked to 
judge a soldier engaging in the harm-doing.  We found strong effects when we asked 
participants to make self-judgments rather than other judgments. When making 
judgments about the self our participants tended to be much harsher than when they were 
making judgments about others. This could possibly be because when making judgments 
about themselves, participants were naturally using interpersonal moral standards. Being 
in combat is extraordinary and clearly difficult to truly imagine unless one has 
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experienced it.  Our participants, young college students, are therefore likely to rely on 
their default morality when making the judgments about themselves in this imagined 
context. However, a soldier who is committed to a mission and is dedicated to the well-
being of the group is easier to imagine. As a soldier his role is defined relative to the 
group. The intergroup moral standards that emerge in such a situation may be somewhat 
intuitive, and therefore participants are liekly to make the more lenient judgments about 
the soldier--the other.  
Unfortunately, none of our experiments using combat scenarios yielded clear 
evidence for how society at large may condemn such transgressions. While we had 
predicted that incidents of harm would be judged more harshly once they returned home, 
we did not find this. It is quite likely that our participants were reluctant to judge the 
soldiers they were reading about harshly because of a sense of obligation that may stem 
from the knowledge that it is inappropriate to criticize these soldiers who are sacrificing 
so much for their county.   
 In addition, combat being an inherently intergroup situation, it is likely that a 
soldier is seen as engaging in intergroup action and thus his/her behavior is judged based 
on these standards.   Therefore, it will be important to further examine this idea in 
conditions removed from combat. This is supported by our findings in the last study 
where we were able to elicit these moral judgments with a situation that was not combat 
related. However, it must be remembered that this study did not replicate the intergroup 
conflict that is so central to the combat scenarios that we were using. Therefore, in future 
studies this should be taken into account and the scenarios, even if they are removed from 
combat, should attempt to mirror the fundamental aspects of intergroup interaction.  
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 Despite these shortcomings, taken together these five studies provide some exciting 
preliminary findings as to the experiences of soldiers and their psychological difficulties, 
specifically reasons why incidents of harm may particularly impact soldiers when they 
return from war.  It appears that context-based moral standards are apt to be used and 
thereby impact self-perceptions and emotions surrounding harm-doing. We hope that this 
knowledge will contribute towards developing new interventions and methods to address 
combat related harm-doing and the manner in which it impacts soldiers’ self-perceptions. 
An understanding of context–based morality and how it affects an individual might 
provide soldiers with the necessary tools to protect themselves when they are faced with 
reintegrating into civil society and the more “judgmental” interpersonal moral standards 
they are likely to confront. 
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Figure 1:  Representation of the duties undertaken by our respondents during 
deployments 
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Figure 2: Reported incidents of perpetration of harm 
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Table 1: Means for main dependent variables for Time 1 and Time 2 
Variable Mean (Time 1) Mean (Time 2) 
Relief 2.70 5.22 
Guilt 3.47 3.89 
Regret 3.70 3.86 
Anger 4.71 3.87 
Anxiety 5.02 4.12 
Fear 4.82 3.24 
Shame 2.77 3.40 
Sadness 4.19 3.64 
Happiness 2.77 4.76 
Moral judgment 4.60 4.20 
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Table 2: Regression analyses looking at impact of Guilt and Shame on Moral Judgments 
 Moral Judgment (Time 1) Moral Judgment (Time 2) 
Guilt and Shame (Time 
1) 
-.22** 
(-3.85) 
-.09 
(-1.84) 
Guilt and Shame (Time 
2) 
-.08 
(-1.53) 
-.20** 
(-4.33) 
 
t statistic within parentheses; **> .000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 76 
 
 
Table 3: Correlations between main dependent variables  
 Soldier 
Guilt 
Should 
Guilt 
Neg. 
Emotion 
Moral 
Total 
Soldier J. 
Soldier Guilt 1     
Should Guilt .36** 1    
Neg. 
Emotion 
-.011 .25** 1   
Moral Total .012 -.31** -.27** 1  
Soldier J. -.016 -.50** -.30** .63** 1 
** <.001 
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Table 4: Means comparison for main dependent variables across all five conditions 
Variable Ingroup – 
Individual  
Ingroup - 
Group 
Outgroup – 
Individual  
Outgroup 
- Group 
Default 
Moral Total 3.6 3.6 3.7 3.2 2.6 
Soldier Judgment 4.7 4.5 4.4 3.9 3.2 
Single item (Guilt) 8.0 6.4 7.5 7.0 7.8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 78 
 
Table 5: Differences in self – other perceptions on main dependent variables 
Variable Mean 
(Self) 
Mean 
(Other) 
F df p 
Negative Emotion 5.0 3.3 41.3 1 .000 
Soldier Judgment 3.7 5.2 24.3 1 .000 
Single item (Guilt) 7.0 6.1 6.62 1 .01 
Single item (Shame) 6.4 5.4 6.17 1 .01 
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Table 6: Means for main dependent variables for individual vs. group benefit conditions 
Variable Individual Group F df p 
Justified 1.8 
 
2.7 4.1 1 .04 
Blameworthy 8.6 
 
8.0 3.8 1 .05 
Guilt 
proneness 
7.2 6.8 3.9 1 .05 
Target 
Morality 
2.2 3.2 16.6 1 .000 
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INTERVIEW SCRIPT 
Thank you for agreeing to an interview with us. (Researchers introduce 
themselves, participants introduce themselves and audiotaping begins). We want to thank 
you for taking part, but we also want you to know that like many other people in this 
country, we are very thankful for your service in the military. It is an extraordinary 
sacrifice on your part and we’re very grateful to you.  
This interview is a first step in trying to explore the subject of how combat 
experiences impact soldiers. In the next 90 minutes or so we want to ask you about some 
ideas we have about the subject and see if they make sense. We want to learn from your 
experiences and ask for your help in deciding how best to address these issues in future 
research. 
Specifically, we are interested in the psychological aftermath of war on our 
veterans.  The psychological distress that is associated with combat  and military service, 
in general, is often framed as the result of soldiers having to repeatedly confront their 
own mortality, danger to their physical well-being and the awareness of their of own 
vulnerability when either they themselves or their buddies are put in harm’s way. Having 
to deal with these fears over and over again is thought to have severe consequences on 
the psychological well-being of soldiers. We are not saying that these theories are wrong, 
but we think that they ignore some important characteristics of modern combat and 
therefore are incomplete. 
Psychologists have recently started to accept that the experiences of soldiers 
serving in Iraq and Afghanistan do not mirror those of what we call traditional combat as 
was seen in World War I and II. With traditional combat there was a clear battlefield, you 
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knew who the enemy was; you could clearly identify who you were fighting.  So it was 
easy to set rules of engagement. You could identify the enemy by the uniform they wore 
and those were the people you would fight, you would shoot, you would kill. But all that 
has changed. Combat today is different, especially when it involves urban warfare and 
the enemy is using guerrilla tactics. These situations are ambiguous. You don’t know 
who the enemy is, it might be the guy carrying the gun but it could also be the teenager 
idling on the street corner, the pregnant woman approaching you or the man driving 
towards a checkpoint. You are never sure of what you are dealing with. You might be 
dealing with the enemy, but by the same token it might be an innocent civilian. To make 
things worse, the fighting often takes place in the middle of highly populated areas. The 
enemy might be counting on this to avoid attacks on themselves. 
Under these very difficult conditions, your utmost concern has to be your survival 
and the survival of your buddies. You would have had to make decisions about what was 
necessary for survival and what was the best way to protect yourself.  Survival under 
these conditions means erring on the side of safety and protection. This might even mean 
that you might have to harm someone in order to meet these goals, even if this someone 
was a civilian.  This adds another layer to the distress suffered by soldiers. That is why 
we think that we need to have a new approach to fully understand the link between 
combat experiences and their psychological consequences in these extraordinary 
situations. 
We are particularly interested in trying to understand the effect these sorts of 
incidents have on a soldier.  How do you decide how to act in these ambiguous 
situations? We are very interested in your feelings about yourself and how they differed 
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when you were in Iraq or Afghanistan and when you returned home. What comes to mind 
when you think about the combat situations that you have witnessed or that you have 
heard about? We are interested in not only your own experiences but also situations 
involving others, incidents you witnessed and stories you have heard from others.  We are 
not looking for right or wrong answers. There is nothing too trivial to be discussed here. 
All opinions are equally important and valuable to us. We are merely interested in getting 
your thoughts, your opinions and gut feelings about this.  
 As the researchers involved in this project we are committed to make this a safe 
experience for you. We want to reiterate that participation in this interview is voluntary. 
If at any time you feel that you want a break or that you want to leave the interview you 
can do so. Also, if in the process of talking you feel overwhelmed or want to talk to 
someone other than the researchers, either let us know so we can put you in touch with 
someone immediately or we also have contact information if you wish to speak to 
someone later on.  
 As we outlined in the consent form we are going to take every precaution to make 
sure that tapes, transcripts and any other material associated with this interview will be 
stored safely and will only be available to Prof. Janoff-Bulman and me. When we 
transcribe the tapes we will also avoid using names. We will also take every possible 
precaution to maintain confidentiality. We can discuss any other questions you have 
before we start. 
Questions: 
• In your experience, what thoughts and feelings do you think are going through a 
soldier’s mind when he or she is asked to go out on a mission?  
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• How would you describe your interactions with Iraqi and Afghan civilians? Do 
you know of instances when civilians were harmed or killed because it was 
impossible to know whether they were a danger to you or your buddies?  
• How did you or others deal with such experiences in Iraq or Afghanistan and 
when you returned home? How did you see yourself when you were still 
surrounded by your buddies? And when you returned home?  Do you think there 
is a difference in the way soldiers deal with such things while still in combat and 
when they return home? 
• Do you think soldiers can talk about this to people back home when they return?  
• When soldiers return, do you think people here at home fully understand what the 
soldiers have been through? Do you feel like soldiers can talk to people here and 
feel that they are understood? 
• How do you think soldiers see their experiences in Iraq or Afghanistan when they 
come back to the US? Do you think they change the way they perceive incidents 
that they faced there when they are removed from the situation? (If yes) Why do 
you think that happens? 
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STUDY 2 MATERIAL  
Please read the following information, carefully before you proceed to the survey. This 
section has important information regarding the survey and your rights as a 
participant.  
 
You are invited to take part in this survey because you are a veteran of the US 
military and have served in Iraq and / Afghanistan. We are trying to understand how the 
combat experiences of soldiers impact the way they perceive themselves.  
 
The survey should take approximately 20 minutes to complete. You can complete it 
in a place where you feel your privacy is not compromised and can return it sealed in the 
envelope provided, to the locked box at the Veterans’ Services Office lobby. The survey 
consists of questions regarding the experiences of soldiers you know. You will not be 
asked for any identifying information. You can refuse to answer any question or section 
that you feel uncomfortable answering. All surveys will be stored in a locked cabinet in a 
secure lab and only the primary investigator and the faculty sponsor will have access to 
these surveys. 
 
There is no known direct benefit to taking part in this study. However, we believe that the 
information we gather will contribute towards understanding the psychological impact of 
combat on soldiers and provide an alternative perspective in the creation of interventions 
for this population. However, once the study is completed, we hope to give the Veterans’ 
Services Office a copy of the write up of our findings. The results of this study will also 
be made available to participants at their request. 
 
The survey should take approximately 20 minutes to complete. The survey includes 
questions about what you might know about the experiences of soldiers who have served 
either in Iraq and or Afghanistan. You may choose to skip questions or sections of the 
survey. All research data will be stored in a locked safe in a secure lab space and will be 
destroyed five years after the research is complete. 
 
Thinking about the battlefield when answering this survey has the potential to cause 
psychological discomfort. If at any point, you wish to talk to someone about the 
discomfort you are feeling please contact Mental Health Services on campus on 413-545-
2337 or the psychological services center on 413-545-0041 or contact the researchers, 
Ramila Usoof MS, rusoof@psych.umass.edu or Ronnie Janoff-Bulman Ph.D. at 413-545-
0264 or janbul@psych.umass.edu. We will arrange for you to meet with a clinician or 
therapist. 
 
The following procedures will be used to protect the confidentiality of your study records.  
The researchers will keep all study records (including any codes to your data) in a secure 
location locked in a filing cabinet in a secure lab.   Research records will be labeled with a 
code.  No names will be associated with the surveys. At the conclusion of this study, the 
researchers may publish their findings.  Information will be presented in summary format 
and you will not be identified in any publications or presentations. There is an exception to 
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confidentiality we need to make you aware of.  As social science researchers, it is our ethical 
responsibility to report situations of child abuse, child neglect, or any life-threatening 
situation to appropriate authorities. 
 
If you have further questions about this project or if you have a research-related problem, 
you may contact the principal investigator, Ramila Usoof MS., at 
rusoof@psych.umass.edu or Ronnie Janoff-Bulman Ph.D. at 413-545-0264 or 
janbul@psych.umass.edu or Melinda Novak, Chair of the Psychology Department at 413-
545-5958 or mnovak@psych.umass.edu.  If you have any questions concerning your 
rights as a research subject, you may contact the University of Massachusetts Amherst 
Human Research Protection Office (HRPO) at (413) 545-3428 or 
humansubjects@ora.umass.edu. 
 
You do not have to be in this study if you do not want to.  If you agree to be in the study, but 
later change your mind, you may drop out at any time.  There are no penalties or 
consequences of any kind if you decide that you do not want to participate. 
 
The University of Massachusetts does not have a program for compensating subjects for 
injury or complications related to human subjects research, but the study personnel will 
assist you in getting treatment. 
 
 
Please check the following box if you have read the information above and consent 
to participating in the study 
 
I have read this form and decided that I will participate in the project described 
above.  The general purposes and particulars of the study as well as possible 
hazards and inconveniences have been explained to my satisfaction.  I understand 
that I can withdraw at any time.   
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1. In which country/countries have you served? (Please check all that apply) 
 
__Iraq  __Afghanistan __Other (Please 
specify)____________________ 
 
2. How many times have you been deployed? 
 
____One ____Two ____Three ____More than three 
 
3. Overall, how many months did you serve in Iraq and/or Afghanistan? 
 
______ months 
 
4. During the time you served in Iraq or Afghanistan in what type of activities were 
you involved? (Check all that apply) 
 
____Search operations ____Intelligence gathering  
 ____Driving in a convoy ____Media 
____Manning checkpoints ____Prisoner transportation  
____Development work ____Providing technical support 
____Medical support ____Transport 
____Other (Please specify)____________________ 
 
5. Did you feel that you had received adequate training to accomplish these tasks 
successfully? 
 
____Yes  ____Somewhat  ____No   
 
6. How important was it for you to make sure everyone in your unit was safe? 
 
____Not at all      ____Somewhat      ____Important      ____Extremely  
        Important     Important                                 Important 
   
7. How important was it for you to make sure that soldiers returned safe from a 
mission? 
 
____Not at all      ____Somewhat       ____Important     ____Extremely  
        Important     Important                                 Important 
 
   
8. How important was it for you to make sure that you returned home to the US 
safely? 
 
____Not at all      ____Somewhat       ____Important     ____Extremely  
        Important     Important                                 Important 
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If you have had multiple deployments, think of the one when you had the most contact 
with civilians and please respond to the questions below. 
 
9. How much contact did you have with civilians? (Check one) 
____No contact   
____Less than once a month   
____Two or three times month 
____A few times a week  
____Almost every day 
____Several times a day 
 
10. How would you describe your interactions with civilians? (Check one) 
 
____Hostile  ____Cautious  ____Cautious but friendly 
____Friendly  ____Other (Please specify)___________________ 
 
11. What did you feel towards these Iraqi or Afghani civilians? Check the two words 
that best describe your feelings towards them. 
 
____Anger  ____Fear   ____Disgust  ____Dislike 
____Hate  ____Sympathy ____Sadness   ____Envy  
____Guilt  ____Pity  ____Compassion
 ____Admiration 
____Contempt 
 
12. Do you know of an American soldier who engaged in any of the following 
actions in Iraq or Afghanistan? (Check all that apply) 
 
____Seriously mistreated a civilian  
____Seriously harmed a civilian  
____Killed a civilian   
 
13. If willing, please describe an incident you know of in a sentence or two. 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________ 
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14. In your opinion, how common were such incidents? 
Extremely  1 2 3 4 5 6 7      Extremely 
            Uncommon                                                                                    Common 
 
In answering the questions below, please have in mind the most serious incident 
involving a civilian you know about or you have heard about. Please respond to all the 
questions below with this soldier and incident in mind. 
 
15. While still in Iraq or Afghanistan, to what extent do you think the American 
soldier felt each of the following emotions?  (Please select one number from the 
scale for each emotion) 
 
 Not At All             Extremely  
Relief   1 2 3 4 5 6 7       
Guilt    1 2 3 4 5 6 7       
Regret     1 2 3 4 5 6 7       
Anger    1 2 3 4 5 6 7       
Anxiety   1 2 3 4 5 6 7       
Fear    1 2 3 4 5 6 7       
Shame    1 2 3 4 5 6 7       
Happiness   1 2 3 4 5 6 7      
Sadness   1 2 3 4 5 6 7       
 
 
16. While still in Iraq or Afghanistan, how do you think the soldier judges his/her 
behavior? 
 
Immoral        1 2 3 4 5 6 7      Moral 
 
Wrong           1 2 3 4 5 6 7      Right 
 
Bad                1 2 3 4 5 6 7      Good       
 
Unjustified      1 2 3 4 5 6 7       Justified 
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17. When soldiers who engaged in such acts return to the U.S., do you think they 
talk about such incidents?  
 
_____Not at all    _____ Rarely     _____Sometimes    _____All the time 
 
 
18. If they discussed the incident at all, who do you think they talk to about the 
incident ?(Check all that apply) 
 
_____ Someone from the chain – of – command, conducting debriefing 
 
_____Friends who have served in the military 
 
_____Friends who have not served in the military 
 
_____Spouse 
 
_____Parents  
 
_____Siblings 
 
_____Therapist 
 
_____Other (Please specify)______________________ 
 
 
 
19. In general, do you think people who have not served in the military (American 
civilians) are able to understand the occurrence of such an event? 
 
_____Yes  ______Somewhat  ______No 
 
 
 
20. Do you think the experience with the civilian changed the way the soldier 
viewed him/herself while still deployed in Iraq or Afghanistan? 
 
_____Not at all  _____Very little  _____Somewhat    
 
______Definitely so 
 
 
21. In your opinion, how often do you believe the soldier thinks about the incident 
during their deployment? 
 
_____Not at all      _____Very little    _____Sometimes    _____A lot    
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_____All the time 
 
 
 
22. After returning to the U.S., to what extent do you think the American soldier 
feels each of the following emotions?  (Please select one number from the scale 
for each emotion) 
  Not At All             Extremely  
Relief    1 2 3 4 5 6 7       
Guilt    1 2 3 4 5 6 7       
Regret   1 2 3 4 5 6 7       
Anger   1 2 3 4 5 6 7       
  Anxiety   1 2 3 4 5 6 7       
  Fear    1 2 3 4 5 6 7       
  Shame   1 2 3 4 5 6 7       
Happiness   1 2 3 4 5 6 7      
Sadness   1 2 3 4 5 6 7       
 
23. After returning to the U.S. and thinking about the incident,  how do you think the 
soldier judges his/her behavior? 
 
Immoral        1 2 3 4 5 6 7      Moral 
 
Wrong           1 2 3 4 5 6 7      Right 
 
Bad                1 2 3 4 5 6 7      Good       
 
Unjustified      1 2 3 4 5 6 7       Justified 
 
24. After returning to the U.S., do you think the past experience with the civilian 
changes the way the soldier views himself/herself? 
 
_____Not at all  _____Very little  _____Somewhat 
______Definitely so 
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25. After returning to the US, how often do you think the soldier thinks about this 
incident? 
 
_____Not at all      _____Very little    _____Sometimes    _____A lot   
_____All the time 
 
 
Please fill in the following information for you self 
 
26. Gender: ____Male     ____Female 
 
27. Age:    ____Years 
 
 
28. To what extent do you approve of the Iraq war? 
 
Strongly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7         Strongly 
Disapprove                                                            Approve 
  
 
29. To what extent do you approve of the Afghan war? 
 
Strongly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7         Strongly 
Disapprove                                                                      Approve  
 
 
Thank you for your participation. Please use the space below if you have any 
comments you would like to make about the survey. 
 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Please detach this page from the survey for your information. 
 
We want to thank you for taking part in our study. We want to reiterate that we will take 
all precautions to maintain your privacy and confidentiality. If you have further questions 
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about this project or if you have a research-related problem, you may contact the 
principal investigator, Ramila Usoof MS., at rusoof@psych.umass.edu or Ronnie Janoff-
Bulman Ph.D. at (413)-545-0264 or janbul@psych.umass.edu or Melinda Novak, Chair 
of the Psychology Department at (413)-545-5958 or mnovak@psych.umass.edu .  If you 
have any questions concerning your rights as a research participant, you may contact the 
University of Massachusetts,  Amherst Human Research Protection Office (HRPO) at 
(413) 545-3428 or humansubjects@ora.umass.edu. If at any point, you wish to talk to 
someone about any discomfort you may feel please contact Mental Health Services on 
campus on 413-545-2337 or the psychological services center on 413-545-0041 or 
contact the researchers, Ramila Usoof MS, rusoof@psych.umass.edu or Ronnie Janoff-
Bulman Ph.D. at 413-545-0264 or janbul@psych.umass.edu. We will arrange for you to 
meet with a clinician or therapist. 
 
We, again, want to thank you for your participation and your service to our 
country.   
 
STUDY 3 MATERIAL 
Condition: Individual X ingroup condition 
 
 Two types of checkpoints are commonly used in modern day battlefields. 
Permanent checkpoints are fixed. These permanent structures are a familiar sight and the 
locals are familiar with their positioning. “Flash checkpoints” are different--they are set 
up quickly, sometimes for as little as a few hours. It is often hard to pick out these 
checkpoints; sometimes the soldiers have mobile barriers that they could use, sometimes 
they are marked with a few cones, and sometimes they have to make do with a few large 
stones that they spread across the street. They are especially hard to make out in the dark 
of night. These checkpoints are important because they are designed to trap those 
trafficking weapons or explosives, those violating military imposed curfews, or suspects 
in bombings or drive-by-shootings.  
Army Specialist Nathan Jones was manning a temporary checkpoint on a rather 
quiet street. He had spent several months as a US army soldier in this area. This area 
wasn’t the safest; Jones felt tense. He already knew of several attacks in this 
neighborhood and this knowledge made him pay closer attention to his surroundings.  
The possibility of an attack loomed every time a vehicle passed by, every time a group of 
young men walked by the check point, every time a man rode past the checkpoint on a 
rickety old bicycle.  
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A few blocks away Abdul Al- Rahman left his compound with his wife. His car 
was old but reliable. He slowly eased up on the gas and turned on to the busy street. 
Army Specialist Jones was still manning the checkpoint when Abdul’s car approached it. 
He noticed an old car carrying multiple occupants approach. Jones held up his hand, his 
palm facing the car, but the driver did not seem to notice. The car kept moving forward at 
a steady pace. Jones had to decide quickly. In a flash he raised his gun to his shoulder and 
shot in the direction of the car. He wasn’t sure where the bullets hit, but the car stopped, 
screeching and swerving as it did.  Abdul was shot, but lived.  His wife, who was in the 
passenger seat, was shot and killed.  The stunned Abdul later explained, “When I saw the 
soldier’s hand go up with his palm facing me, I thought he was telling me to come 
forward.  I didn’t think it meant stop.” 
 
 
Condition: group X ingroup condition 
 
Two types of checkpoints are commonly used in modern day battlefields. 
Permanent checkpoints are fixed. These permanent structures are a familiar sight and the 
locals are familiar with their positioning. “Flash checkpoints” are different--they are set 
up quickly, sometimes for as little as a few hours. It is often hard to pick out these 
checkpoints; sometimes the soldiers have mobile barriers that they could use, sometimes 
they are marked with a few cones, and sometimes they have to make do with a few large 
stones that they spread across the street. They are especially hard to make out in the dark 
of night. These checkpoints are important because they are designed to trap those 
trafficking weapons or explosives, those violating military imposed curfews, or suspects 
in bombings or drive-by-shootings.  
A group of US soldiers were manning a temporary checkpoint on a rather quiet 
street. They had spent several months in this area. This area wasn’t the safest; they felt 
tense. They already knew of several attacks in this neighborhood and this knowledge 
made them pay closer attention to their surroundings.  The possibility of an attack loomed 
every time a vehicle passed by, every time a group of young men walked by the check 
point, every time a man rode past the checkpoint on a rickety old bicycle.  
A few blocks away an Iraqi left his compound with his wife. His car was old but 
reliable. He slowly eased up on the gas and turned on to the busy street. The soldiers 
were still manning the checkpoint when the Iraqi man’s car approached it. They noticed 
an old car carrying multiple occupants approach. One of them held up his hand, his palm 
facing the car, but the driver did not seem to notice. The car kept moving forward at a 
steady pace. The soldiers had to decide quickly. In a flash a soldier raised his gun to his 
shoulder and shot in the direction of the car. He wasn’t sure where the bullets hit, but the 
car stopped, screeching and swerving as it did.  The Iraqi was shot, but lived.  His wife, 
who was in the passenger seat, was shot and killed.  The stunned man later explained, 
“When I saw the soldier’s hand go up with his palm facing me, I thought he was telling 
me to come forward.  I didn’t think it meant stop.” 
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Condition: Individual X other affiliation 
 
Two types of checkpoints are commonly used in modern day battlefields. 
Permanent checkpoints are fixed. These permanent structures are a familiar sight and the 
locals are familiar with their positioning. “Flash checkpoints” are different--they are set 
up quickly, sometimes for as little as a few hours. It is often hard to pick out these 
checkpoints; sometimes the soldiers have mobile barriers that they could use, sometimes 
they are marked with a few cones, and sometimes they have to make do with a few large 
stones that they spread across the street. They are especially hard to make out in the dark 
of night. These checkpoints are important because they are designed to trap those 
trafficking weapons or explosives, those violating military imposed curfews, or suspects 
in bombings or drive-by-shootings.  
Army Specialist Sergey Fedorov was manning a temporary checkpoint on a rather 
quiet streetin Grozny, Chechnya. He had spent several months as a Russian army soldier 
in this area. This area wasn’t the safest; Fedorov felt tense. He already knew of several 
attacks in this neighborhood and this knowledge made him pay closer attention to his 
surroundings.  The possibility of an attack loomed every time a vehicle passed by, every 
time a group of young men walked by the check point, every time a man rode past the 
checkpoint on a rickety old bicycle.  
A few blocks away Arslan Ramdanov left his compound with his wife. His car 
was old but reliable. He slowly eased up on the gas and turned on to the busy street. 
Army Specialist Fedorov was still manning the checkpoint when Arslan’s car approached 
it. He noticed an old car carrying multiple occupants approach. Fedorov held up his hand, 
his palm facing the car, but the driver did not seem to notice. The car kept moving 
forward at a steady pace. Fedorov had to decide quickly. In a flash he raised his gun to 
his shoulder and shot in the direction of the car. He wasn’t sure where the bullets hit, but 
the car stopped, screeching and swerving as it did.  Arslan was shot, but lived.  His wife, 
who was in the passenger seat, was shot and killed.  The stunned Arslan later explained, 
“When I saw the soldier’s hand go up with his palm facing me, I thought he was telling 
me to come forward.  I didn’t think it meant stop.” 
 
Condition: Group X other affiliation 
 
Two types of checkpoints are commonly used in modern day battlefields. 
Permanent checkpoints are fixed. These permanent structures are a familiar sight and the 
locals are familiar with their positioning. “Flash checkpoints” are different--they are set 
up quickly, sometimes for as little as a few hours. It is often hard to pick out these 
checkpoints; sometimes the soldiers have mobile barriers that they could use, sometimes 
they are marked with a few cones, and sometimes they have to make do with a few large 
stones that they spread across the street. They are especially hard to make out in the dark 
of night. These checkpoints are important because they are designed to trap those 
trafficking weapons or explosives, those violating military imposed curfews, or suspects 
in bombings or drive-by-shootings.  
 A group of Russian soldiers were manning a temporary checkpoint on a rather 
quiet street in Grozny, Russia. They had spent several months in this area. This area 
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wasn’t the safest; they felt tense. They already knew of several attacks in this 
neighborhood and this knowledge made them pay closer attention to their surroundings.  
The possibility of an attack loomed every time a vehicle passed by, every time a group of 
young men walked by the check point, every time a man rode past the checkpoint on a 
rickety old bicycle.  
A few blocks away a Chechen man left his compound with his wife. His car was 
old but reliable. He slowly eased up on the gas and turned on to the busy street. The 
soldiers were still manning the checkpoint when the Chechen man’s car approached it. 
They noticed an old car carrying multiple occupants approach. One of them held up his 
hand, his palm facing the car, but the driver did not seem to notice. The car kept moving 
forward at a steady pace. The soldiers had to decide quickly. In a flash a soldier raised his 
gun to his shoulder and shot in the direction of the car. He wasn’t sure where the bullets 
hit, but the car stopped, screeching and swerving as it did.  The Chechen was shot, but 
lived.  His wife, who was in the passenger seat, was shot and killed.  The stunned man 
later explained, “When I saw the soldier’s hand go up with his palm facing me, I thought 
he was telling me to come forward.  I didn’t think it meant stop.” 
 
Condition: Individual X other (out of war context) 
 
Bright yellow and black tape with the word ‘do not cross’ is often used to 
demarcate crime scenes. However, sometimes when the area is too large, the police 
would often set up a wooden barricades around the area. On this particular night the 
police had set up barricades around a house where a drive by shooting had just taken 
place. No one was injured and the family was still inside. The police wanted to make sure 
there was no other incident that same night. 
Nathan Jones, an off duty police officer was standing on the side walk on the now 
quiet street. He had lived a long time in this area. After the incident this area didn’t feel 
the safest; Jones felt tense.  The possibility of an attack loomed every time a vehicle 
passed by or every time a group of young men walked by the barricade. 
A few blocks away Paul Jenkins left his compound with his wife. His car was old 
but reliable. He slowly eased up on the gas and turned on to the busy street. Jones was 
still standing on the sidewalk when Paul’s car approached it. He noticed an old car 
carrying multiple occupants approach. Jones held up his hand, his palm facing the car, 
but the driver did not seem to notice. The car kept moving forward at a steady pace. Jones 
had to decide quickly. In a flash he raised his gun and shot in the direction of the car. He 
wasn’t sure where the bullets hit, but the car stopped, screeching and swerving as it did.  
Paul was shot, but lived.  His wife, who was in the passenger seat, was shot and killed.  
The stunned Paul later explained, “I wasn’t sure what the man was signaling me to do; I 
thought he might be beckoning me to drive up to the barricade. 
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Please respond to the following questions by circling the number that best describes 
how you feel. 
How justified was the soldier(s) / police officer in shooting at the car? 
Not at 
all 
justified 
   Somewhat 
justified 
   Completely 
justified 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
In your opinion how good or bad would you rate the soldier(s)’s / police officer’s 
behavior? 
Bad    Not 
sure 
   Good 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
In your opinion how moral or immoral would you rate the soldier(s)’s / police 
officer’s behavior? 
Immoral    Not 
sure 
   Moral 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Do you think the soldier(s) / police officer should be punished? 
Should 
not be 
punished 
at all 
   Not 
sure 
   Should 
be 
punished 
severely 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
How empathic do you feel toward soldier(s) / police officer? 
Not at 
all 
   Somewhat 
empathic 
   Extremely 
empathic 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
 
How empathic do you feel toward the driver of the vehicle? 
Not at 
all 
   Somewhat 
empathic 
   Extremely 
empathic 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
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How blameworthy do you think the soldier(s) / police officer for the death? 
 
Not at 
all 
   Somewhat 
blameworthy 
   Completely 
blameworthy 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
 
How blameworthy do you the driver is for the death? 
 
Not at 
all 
   Somewhat 
blameworthy 
   Completely 
blameworthy 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
How guilty do you think the soldier(s) / police officer feel(s) for the death of the 
woman? 
  
Not at 
all 
   Somewhat 
blameworthy 
   Completely 
blameworthy 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
 
 
Please circle a number on the following scale that appropriately reflects how you felt 
when you read the description. 
 
 
 Not at all      Extremely 
Angry 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Sad 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Proud 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Guilty 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Ashamed 1 
 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
Disgust 1 
 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
Fear 1 
 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
Surprise 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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We are interested in your reactions to what the soldier(s) / police officer did.  Using 
the scales below, please circle the number that best correspondents to how you view 
the soldier(s)’s / police officer’s behavior.  
 
Immoral        1 2 3 4 5 6 7      Moral 
 
Wrong           1 2 3 4 5 6 7      Right 
 
Bad                1 2 3 4 5 6 7      Good 
 
Unacceptable1 2 3 4 5 6 7      Acceptable 
 
Inexcusable   1 2 3 4 5 6 7       Excusable 
 
Dishonest       1 2 3 4 5 6 7       Honest 
 
Irresponsible 1 2 3 4 5 6 7      Responsible 
 
Uncommon    1 2 3 4 5 6 7      Common 
 
STUDY 4 MATERIAL 
Please read the following event description 
Supply convoys are ubiquitous in Iraq. They usually consist of 20 to 30 trucks and 
military escort vehicles that can extend for as long as a mile. The trucks have a Humvee 
military escort in front and back and at least one in the center. Soldiers and Marines also 
often accompany the drivers in the cabs of tractor–trailers.  
When the columns of vehicles leave their heavily fortified compounds, they 
usually have to drive fast and make sure that they are moving constantly. Veterans say it 
is common for insurgents to attempt to slow convoys down or halt them before an attack 
by sending civilian vehicles to create a traffic jam. Sometimes insurgents toss explosive 
devices from vehicles or pack explosives into vehicles that detonate with the driver upon 
impact with a convoy vehicle. The troops live in a world where remaining stationary can 
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mean death, and constant movement is seen as essential to survival. Convoys, because 
they are large, lumbering targets, place a premium on constant movement.  
Because of the chaos in Iraq and the sudden appearance of rapidly moving 
convoys, troops often saw panicked Iraqi drivers desperately attempting to get their 
vehicles out of the way of the huge trucks. But given soldiers’ experiences, any Iraqi 
vehicles that passed the convoy or moved into spaces between the convoy vehicles still 
had to be viewed with great suspicion. 
 
 
 
Solve the following 10 anagrams 
 
TREASON    _____________________    
 
WREATHE    _____________________ 
 
THICKENS    _____________________ 
 
RELATION    _____________________ 
 
RECITALS    _____________________ 
 
POINTERS    _____________________ 
 
NAMELESS    _____________________   
 
VIEWERS    _____________________ 
 
 
 
 This is a continuation of the event description you were reading, previously. Please 
complete reading it before you respond to the questions below. 
 
Army Specialist Jonathan Smith was sitting on a tall stool in the dimly lit bar drinking a 
cold beer. His friends Matt and Ron were seated not far from him, talking loudly trying to 
make themselves heard over the general din of the bar. As he sat there finishing his beer, 
Jonathan remembered that warm summer day about one month ago, just before he 
returned home. He was heading down a dangerous four-lane highway nicknamed RPG 
Alley at the front of a slow-moving military convoy. He knew he had to be extra 
watchful, knowing that convoys had frequently come under attack along this stretch of 
road.  As they rumbled along he tried to focus on the Iraqis along the route and the 
vehicles that swerved to get out of the way of the convoy. Iraqi civilians were supposed 
to understand that getting in the way of a convoy could be dangerous; there had been 
numerous instances when drivers had been shot at.   
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As they rumbled along, Army Specialist Smith noticed a new blue sedan 
attempting to pass the convoy. The driver didn’t seem to pay attention to the convoy. 
Rather he continued to drive right past the vehicles of the convoy.  For a moment Smith 
was stunned as he watched the car approach. He fired at the car, causing the driver, an 
Iraqi man, to slam on his brakes. The convoy did not stop to survey the damage. The man 
was shot and seriously wounded. He started sobbing and explained why he had attempted 
to overtake the convoy: “I was just going to the hospital to see my newborn son. I was in 
a hurry, so I tried to pass the trucks, and they shot me.”  
 
 
This is a continuation of the event description you were reading, previously. Please 
complete reading it before you respond to the questions below. 
Army Specialist Jonathan Smith was sitting on a tall stool in the dimly lit bunker drinking 
his beer. His friends Matt and Ron were seated not far from him. They were talking rather 
loudly to make themselves heard over the rumbling of vehicles above, outside the bunker. 
As he sat there finishing his beer, Jonathan remembered that warm summer day about a 
month before. He was heading down a dangerous four-lane highway nicknamed RPG 
Alley at the front of a slow-moving military convoy. He knew he had to be extra 
watchful, knowing that convoys had frequently come under attack along this stretch of 
road.  As they rumbled along he tried to focus on the Iraqis along the route and the 
vehicles that swerved to get out of the way of the convoy. Iraqi civilians were supposed 
to understand that getting in the way of a convoy could be dangerous; there had been 
numerous instances when drivers had been shot at.   
As they rumbled along, Army Specialist Smith noticed a new blue sedan 
attempting to pass the convoy. The driver didn’t seem to pay attention to the convoy. 
Rather he continued to drive right past the vehicles of the convoy.  For a moment Smith 
was stunned as he watched the car approach. He fired at the car, causing the driver, an 
Iraqi man, to slam on his brakes. The convoy did not stop to survey the damage. The man 
was shot and seriously wounded. He started sobbing and explained why he had attempted 
to overtake the convoy: “I was just going to the hospital to see my newborn son. I was in 
a hurry, so I tried to pass the trucks, and they shot me.” 
Imagine you are Army Specialist Jonathan Smith. Respond to the following scales 
by circling the number that best reflects how you feel. 
How justified do you think you would feel in shooting at the car? 
Not at 
all 
justified 
   Somewhat 
justified 
   Completely 
justified 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
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In your opinion how good or bad would you feel ? 
Bad    Not 
sure 
   Good 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
In your opinion how moral or immoral would you feel you are? 
Immoral    Not 
sure 
   Moral 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
How empathic would you feel toward the driver of the vehicle? 
Not at 
all 
   Somewhat 
empathic 
   Extremely 
empathic 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
 
How blameworthy do you think you would feel about the death? 
 
Not at 
all 
   Somewhat 
blameworthy 
   Completely 
blameworthy 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
 
How guilty do you think you would be about the shooting? 
  
Not at 
all 
   Somewhat 
guilty 
   Completely 
guilty 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
 
 
 
How ashamed do you think you would be about the shooting? 
  
Not at 
all 
   Somewhat 
ashamed 
   Completely 
ashamed 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Please circle a number on the following scale that appropriately reflects how you 
would feel about having shot at the man 
 
 Not at all      Extremely 
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Angry 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Sad 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Proud 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Guilty 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Ashamed 1 
 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
Disgust 1 
 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
Fear 1 
 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
Surprise 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Please circle the number that best corresponds to how you would perceive your 
behavior if you were Army Specialist Jonathan Smith’s situation. 
 
Immoral        1 2 3 4 5 6 7      Moral 
 
Wrong           1 2 3 4 5 6 7      Right 
 
Bad                1 2 3 4 5 6 7      Good 
 
Unacceptable1 2 3 4 5 6 7      Acceptable 
 
Inexcusable   1 2 3 4 5 6 7       Excusable 
 
Dishonest       1 2 3 4 5 6 7       Honest 
 
Irresponsible 1 2 3 4 5 6 7      Responsible 
 
Respond to the following scales by circling the number that best reflects how you 
feel about Army Specialist Jonathan Smith. 
How justified do you think Army Specialist Smith was in shooting at the car? 
Not at    Somewhat    Completely 
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all 
justified 
justified justified 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
In your opinion how good or bad is Army Specialist Smith? 
Bad    Not 
sure 
   Good 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
In your opinion how moral or immoral is Army Specialist Smith? 
Immoral    Not 
sure 
   Moral 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
How empathic are you toward the driver of the vehicle? 
Not at 
all 
   Somewhat 
empathic 
   Extremely 
empathic 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
 
How blameworthy do you think Army Specialist Smith is for the death? 
 
Not at 
all 
   Somewhat 
blameworthy 
   Completely 
blameworthy 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
 
How guilty do you think Army Specialist Smith would be about the shooting? 
  
Not at 
all 
   Somewhat 
guilty 
   Completely 
guilty 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
How ashamed do you think Army Specialist Smith would be about the shooting? 
  
Not at 
all 
   Somewhat 
ashamed 
   Completely 
ashamed 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Please circle a number on the following scale that appropriately reflects how you 
feel about Army Specialist Smith. 
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 Not at all      Extremely 
Angry 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Sad 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Proud 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Guilty 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Ashamed 1 
 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
Disgust 1 
 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
Fear 1 
 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
Surprise 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
Please circle the number that best corresponds to how you perceive Army Specialist 
Smith’s behavior 
 
Immoral        1 2 3 4 5 6 7      Moral 
 
Wrong           1 2 3 4 5 6 7      Right 
 
Bad                1 2 3 4 5 6 7      Good 
 
Unacceptable1 2 3 4 5 6 7      Acceptable 
 
Inexcusable   1 2 3 4 5 6 7       Excusable 
 
Dishonest       1 2 3 4 5 6 7       Honest 
 
Irresponsible 1 2 3 4 5 6 7      Responsible 
 
Demographic questionnaire 
 
1. Gender:  Male    
Female 
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2. Age: 
 
 
3. What ethnic group do you identify with the most? ( Please circle one) 
 
African American  Asian American  Hispanic     
Middle Eastern  Native American  White    
Cape Verdean 
 
Other (specify) 
 
 
4. What is your religion? (Please circle one) 
 
Buddhism   Catholicism   Christianity   
Islam   Judaism   
 
Other (specify) 
 
5. How many years of schooling have you completed? 
 
Freshman   Sophomore   Junior  Senior 
 
Other  
 
6. How would you describe your political affiliation? 
 
Democrat    Republican    Independent 
 
STUDY 5 MATERIAL 
 
Please read the following paragraph, carefully and respond to the questions below. 
 
John, a freshman at the University of Massachusetts, plagiarized over half of a 
paper that he was assigned to do for an English class. Almost six full pages were copied 
word for word from the original source. The paper was assigned as part of a final group 
project. Before the paper was due, the course professor informed the class that students 
would receive a group grade for this final project.  Each student in the group selected a 
different author to examine.  John said that he only plagiarized the paper so that his group 
would get a good grade on it. He had had a rough week and was unable to do the amount 
of work that was required for an excellent paper. So instead of getting a bad grade by 
writing a terrible paper, John decided it would be better if he used some information he 
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had found in the library.  John plagiarized but was not caught, and his group got a very 
good grade on the final project.  
 
 
How justified do you think John was in plagiarizing his paper? 
Not at 
all 
justified 
   Somewhat 
justified 
   Completely 
justified 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
How blameworthy do you think John was for plagiarizing his paper? 
Not at 
all 
   Somewhat 
blameworthy 
   Completely 
blameworthy 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
How guilty do you think John feels about plagiarizing his paper? 
Not at 
all 
   Somewhat 
guilty 
   Completely 
guilty 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
How ashamed do you think John feels about plagiarizing his paper?  
Not at 
all 
   Somewhat 
ashamed 
   Completely 
ashamed 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
 
How guilty do you think John should feel about plagiarizing his paper? 
Not at 
all 
   Somewhat 
guilty 
   Completely 
guilty 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
How ashamed do you think John should feel about plagiarizing his paper?  
Not at 
all 
   Somewhat 
ashamed 
   Completely 
ashamed 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
 
 
We are interested in your reactions to what John did.  There are no right or wrong 
answers.  Using the scales below, please circle the number that best correspondents 
to how you view his behavior.  
 
Immoral           1     2     3       4     5     6       7               Moral 
Wrong              1     2     3     4     5     6       7               Right 
Bad                     1     2     3     4     5     6       7               Good 
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Unacceptable     1     2     3     4     5     6       7               Acceptable 
Inexcusable        1     2     3     4     5     6       7               Excusable 
Dishonest           1     2     3     4     5     6       7               Honest 
Irresponsible     1     2     3     4     5     6       7               Responsible 
 
 
 
 
 
For each trait listed below, please circle the number that best indicates what you 
think about John in this case.                             
                                         Not at all                                                           Extremely 
Competent   1          2          3          4          5          6          7          
Sociable   1          2          3          4          5          6          7          
Well-intentioned  1          2          3          4          5          6          7          
Skillful     1          2          3          4          5          6          7          
Trustworthy   1          2          3          4          5          6          7           
Good-natured   1          2          3          4          5          6          7          
Friendly   1          2          3          4          5          6          7          
Confident   1          2          3          4          5          6          7           
Moral    1          2          3          4          5          6          7          
Intelligent   1          2          3          4          5          6          7          
Warm    1          2          3          4          5          6          7          
Honest     1          2          3          4          5          6          7          
 
 
1. Gender:  Male    
Female 
 
 
2. Age: 
 
 
3. What ethnic group do you identify with the most? ( Please circle one) 
 
African American  Asian American  Hispanic     
Middle Eastern  Native American  White    
Cape Verdean 
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Other (specify) 
 
 
4. What is your religion? (Please circle one) 
 
Buddhism   Catholicism   Protestant   
Islam   Judaism   
 
Other (specify) 
 
 
5. How would you describe your political affiliation? 
 
Democrat    Republican    Independent 
 
 
Thank you! 
 
Please read the following paragraph, carefully and respond to the questions below. 
 
John, a freshman at the University of Massachusetts, plagiarized over half of a 
paper that he was assigned to do for an English class. Almost six full pages were copied 
word for word from the original source. The paper was assigned as part of a final group 
project. Each student in the class selected a different author to examine.  John said that he 
only plagiarized the paper in order to get a good grade on it. He had had a rough week 
and was unable to do the amount of work that was required for an excellent paper. So 
instead of getting a bad grade by writing a terrible paper, John decided it would be better 
if he used some information he had found in the library.  John plagiarized but was not 
caught, and he got a very good grade on the final project.  
 
How justified do you think John was in plagiarizing his paper? 
Not at 
all 
justified 
   Somewhat 
justified 
   Completely 
justified 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
How blameworthy do you think John was for plagiarizing his paper? 
Not at 
all 
   Somewhat 
blameworthy 
   Completely 
blameworthy 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
How guilty do you think John feels about plagiarizing his paper? 
Not at 
all 
   Somewhat 
guilty 
   Completely 
guilty 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
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How ashamed do you think John feels about plagiarizing his paper?  
Not at 
all 
   Somewhat 
ashamed 
   Completely 
ashamed 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
 
How guilty do you think John should feel about plagiarizing his paper? 
Not at 
all 
   Somewhat 
guilty 
   Completely 
guilty 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
How ashamed do you think John should feel about plagiarizing his paper?  
Not at 
all 
   Somewhat 
ashamed 
   Completely 
ashamed 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
 
 
We are interested in your reactions to what John did.  There are no right or wrong 
answers.  Using the scales below, please circle the number that best correspondents 
to how you view his behavior.  
 
Immoral           1     2     3       4     5     6       7               Moral 
Wrong              1     2     3     4     5     6       7               Right 
Bad                     1     2     3     4     5     6       7               Good 
Unacceptable     1     2     3     4     5     6       7               Acceptable 
Inexcusable        1     2     3     4     5     6       7               Excusable 
Dishonest           1     2     3     4     5     6       7               Honest 
Irresponsible     1     2     3     4     5     6       7               Responsible 
 
For each trait listed below, please circle the number that best indicates what you 
think about John in this case.                             
                                         Not at all                                                           Extremely 
Competent   1          2          3          4          5          6          7          
Sociable   1          2          3          4          5          6          7          
Well-intentioned  1          2          3          4          5          6          7          
Skillful     1          2          3          4          5          6          7          
Trustworthy   1          2          3          4          5          6          7           
Good-natured   1          2          3          4          5          6          7          
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Friendly   1          2          3          4          5          6          7          
Confident   1          2          3          4          5          6          7           
Moral    1          2          3          4          5          6          7          
Intelligent   1          2          3          4          5          6          7          
Warm    1          2          3          4          5          6          7          
Honest     1          2          3          4          5          6          7          
 
1. Gender:  Male    
Female 
 
 
2. Age: 
 
 
3. What ethnic group do you identify with the most? ( Please circle one) 
 
African American  Asian American  Hispanic     
Middle Eastern  Native American  White    
Cape Verdean 
 
Other (specify) 
 
 
4. What is your religion? (Please circle one) 
 
Buddhism   Catholicism   Protestant   
Islam   Judaism   
 
Other (specify) 
 
 
5. How would you describe your political affiliation? 
 
Democrat    Republican    Independent 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you! 
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